Vanderbilt University Law School

Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2021

Preventive Justice: How Algorithms Parole Boards, and Limiting
Retributivism Could End Mass Incarceration
Christopher Slobogin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons

DATE DOWNLOADED: Thu Oct 28 13:06:29 2021
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Christopher Slobogin, Preventive Justice: How Algorithms, Parole Boards, and Limiting
Retributivism Could End Mass Incarceration, 56 WAKE Forest L. REV. 97 (2021).
ALWD 6th ed.
Slobogin, C. ., Preventive justice: How algorithms, parole boards, and limiting
retributivism could end mass incarceration, 56(1) Wake Forest L. Rev. 97 (2021).
APA 7th ed.
Slobogin, C. (2021). Preventive justice: How algorithms, parole boards, and limiting
retributivism could end mass incarceration. Wake Forest Law Review, 56(1), 97-168.
Chicago 17th ed.
Christopher Slobogin, "Preventive Justice: How Algorithms, Parole Boards, and
Limiting Retributivism Could End Mass Incarceration," Wake Forest Law Review 56, no.
1 (2021): 97-168
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Christopher Slobogin, "Preventive Justice: How Algorithms, Parole Boards, and
Limiting Retributivism Could End Mass Incarceration" (2021) 56:1 Wake Forest L Rev
97.
AGLC 4th ed.
Christopher Slobogin, 'Preventive Justice: How Algorithms, Parole Boards, and
Limiting Retributivism Could End Mass Incarceration' (2021) 56(1) Wake Forest Law
Review 97.
MLA 8th ed.
Slobogin, Christopher. "Preventive Justice: How Algorithms, Parole Boards, and
Limiting Retributivism Could End Mass Incarceration." Wake Forest Law Review, vol.
56, no. 1, 2021, p. 97-168. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Christopher Slobogin, 'Preventive Justice: How Algorithms, Parole Boards, and
Limiting Retributivism Could End Mass Incarceration' (2021) 56 Wake Forest L Rev 97
Provided by:
Vanderbilt University Law School
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

PREVENTIVE JUSTICE: HOW ALGORITHMS, PAROLE
BOARDS, AND LIMITING RETRIBUTIVISM COULD
END MASS INCARCERATION
ChristopherSlobogin*

A number of states use statisticallyderived algorithms to
provide estimates of the risk of reoffending. In theory, these
risk assessment instruments could bring significant benefits.
Fewer people of all ethnicities would be put in jail prior to
trial and in prison after conviction, the durationof sentences
would be reduced for low-risk offenders, and treatment
resources would be more efficiently allocated. As a result, the
capital outlays for prisons and jails would be substantially
reduced. The public would continue to be protected from the
most dangerous individuals, while lower-risk individuals
would be less subject to the criminogenic effects of
incarcerationand better positioned to build and maintain a
life outside of jail or prison that does not involve criminal
activity.
Risk assessment instruments cannot fully realize these
benefits, however, unless the currently popular determinate
sentencing structure that exists in most states is dramatically
altered. Today, determinatesentencing states give almost all
sentencing power to prosecutors, who in essence fix the
sentence range through chargingpractices, and judges, who
decide where within the range the sentence will fall and
occasionally select a sentence outside that range. The result
is that even an offender who poses a low risk of reoffending
will often receive a lengthy sentence of imprisonment.

* For their feedback on this Article, the author would like to thank
participants in workshops at Duke, Chicago, Ohio State, Utah, Vanderbilt,
Washington Law Schools, and at Oxford University, as well as Melissa Hamilton,
John Monahan, Michael O'Hear, and Jennifer Skeem. A small part of this Article
appeared as Limiting Retributivism and Individual Prevention, in THE
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON THE PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE OF PUNISHMENT (Farah

Focquaert, ed., 2020). A much fuller version of this Article and additional
material will appear in a forthcoming book to be published by Cambridge
University Press, entitled JUST ALGORITHMS: USING SCIENCE TO REDUCE
INCARCERATION AND INFORM A JURISPRUDENCE OF RISK (forthcoming 2021).
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This Article describes what it calls a preventive justice
sentencing regime, which adopts sentence ranges consistent
with the offender's desert and then relies on expert parole
boards to determine the nature and duration of sentence
within this range, based on consideration of individual
prevention goals (i.e., incapacitation,specific deterrence, and
rehabilitation) as measured through risk assessment
instruments. In the course of doing so, it defends risk
assessment instruments, which have been subject to a wide
range of attacks on accuracy and fairness grounds. A wellconstructedsystem of preventive justice can alleviate many of
the inherent tensions between desert and prevention, between
deontology and political reality, and between the desire for
community input and the allure of expertise. If done properly,
it should also significantly reduce prisonpopulations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When it comes to criminal justice, change is in the air. From calls
to Defund the Police1 and Abolish Prisons 2 to the Eight Can't Wait3
and Smart Sentencing 4 initiatives, a cacophony of proposals for
reorienting policing, pretrial detention decision-making,
and
sentencing are jumping out of academic journals and into mainstream
political culture. This Article adds to the reformist hubbub by
proposing dramatic changes to our system of punishment. It calls for
a system of "preventive justice" that harks back to the days of
sentences determined by parole boards, but with two important
twists: sentence ranges would be consistent with retributive
principles, and release would be required at the expiration of the low
end of the range unless the offender is found to pose a high risk for
committing violent crime, based on the results of a statistically
derived risk assessment tool.
The prescriptions advanced here will undoubtedly strike many
would-be reformers as the opposite of a reform agenda-a throwback
to worn-out ideas and a dangerous endorsement of flawed, biased, and
mechanistic technologies. The burden of this Article is to persuade
otherwise.
Meeting that burden begins by emphasizing that a primary goal
of preventive justice is to put a significant dent in our incarceration
rates and massive prison populations. It is well-known that the
imprisonment rate in the United States has skyrocketed since the late
1960s, from the neighborhood of one hundred people per one hundred
thousand, to somewhere between five to seven hundred people per one
hundred thousand, so that now prisons and jails house well over two
million individuals. 5
Although prison growth has moderated
somewhat in the past several years, 6 the pace of contraction has been
1. See Black Lives Matter Can., It's Time for a Change, DEFUND THE POLICE,
https://defundthepolice.org/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
2. See Landing Page, ABOLISH PRISONS, https://abolishprisons.org/ (last
visited Mar. 15, 2021).
3. See Campaign Zero, Landing Page, #8CANTWAIT, https://8cantwait.org/
(last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
4. See Smart Sentencing Coalition, EMPOWER MO., https://empower
missouri.org/smart-sentencing-coalition/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
5. Compare ROY WALMSLEY, INST. FOR CRIM. POL'Y RSCH., WORLD PRISON
POPULATION LIST 2, 6 tbl.2 (12th ed. 2018), https://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/
default/files/resources/downloads/wppl_12.pdf (listing the U.S. rate as 655
imprisoned per 100,000), with E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., NCJ 253516,
PRISONERS IN 2018, at 9 tbl.5, 10 tbl.6, 2 (2020), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/p18.pdf (listing the U.S. rate as 431 imprisoned per 100,000 for
residents of all ages and 555 imprisoned per 100,000 for residents age eighteen
or older despite also including individuals in "boot camps, halfway houses,
treatment facilities, hospitals, local jails, or another state's facilities").
6.

JACOB KANG-BROWN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., PEOPLE IN PRISON IN

2018, at

1-2 (2019), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/people-in-
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slow. By one estimate, at the current rate of downturn, it will take
until 2101 for the prison population to return to its 1980 level.7
A growing number of policymakers and commentators think that
postconviction incarceration rates are an acute problem. Those on the
left are most concerned about the human cost, not only to suspects
and offenders but to their families and their communities.
In
particular, these critics point to the huge proportion of people of color
who are in prison-at a rate roughly six times that of whites 8-and to
the disruption that imprisonment causes to the families and
neighborhoods of those who are confined. 9 More generally, critics

prison-in-2018-updated.pdf (noting a 1.8 percent drop in prisoners, but also
noting the drop is largely attributable to reductions in federal prisons and in
seven states, at least four of which have "large prison populations," while "[t]he
number of people in prison increased in 19 states").
7. Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Minimizing the Maximum: The Case for Shortening
All Prison Sentences, in SMART DECARCERATION: ACHIEVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
TRANSFORMATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 137, 139 (Matthew W. Epperson & Carrie

Pettus-Davis eds., 2017); see also Malcolm C. Young, Why 'Tweaking Around the
Edges' Won't Reduce Mass Incarceration, CRIME REP. (May 2, 2019),
https://thecrimereport.org/2019/05/02/why-tweaking-around-the-edges-wontreduce-mass-incarceration/ (predicting that, at best, the American prison
population-which does not include jail tallies-will not fall below one million
until 2042).
8.

MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE

AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 148 (2020) (citing EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A.
JONES, NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME

&

DELINQ., AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL

TREATMENT OF YOUTH OF COLOR IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2000)).

The disparity

holds true even when other factors are held constant. See COMM. ON LAW & JUST.,
NAT'L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE

UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 5 (Jeremy Travis et al.

eds., 2014) ("Among white male high school dropouts born in the late 1970s, about
one-third are estimated to have served time in prison by their mid-30s. Yet
incarceration rates have reached even higher levels among young black men with
little schooling: among black male high school dropouts, about two-thirds have a
prison record by that same age-more than twice the rate for their white
counterparts.").
9. See COMM. ON LAW & JUST., NAT'L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS.,
supra note 8, at 6 ("The partners and children of prisoners are particularly likely
to experience adverse outcomes if the men were positively involved with their
families prior to incarceration."); FREDERIC G. REAMER, ON THE PAROLE BOARD:
REFLECTIONS ON CRIME, PUNISHMENT,

REDEMPTION, AND JUSTICE

257

(2017)

("Incarceration is also strongly correlated with negative social and economic
outcomes for former prisoners and their families. . . . Men with a criminal record
often experience reduced earnings and employment after prison . . . . Fathers'
incarceration and family hardship, including housing insecurity and behavioral
problems in children, are strongly related."); Nicole Lewis & Beatrix Lockwood,
How Families Cope with the Hidden Costs of Incarcerationfor the Holidays, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/17/us/incarcerationholidays-family-costs.html (stating that families spend $2.9 billion a year on
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emphasize the research that suggests that imprisonment is itself
criminogenic.1 0 Those on the right may have these reactions as well,1 1
but are probably at least as concerned about the cost of prisons, jails,
and correctional staff.12 The money spent on the carceral state has
quadrupled since the 1990s, to upwards of $80 billion a year, 13 and
the indirect costs of this prison boom have been estimated at over
$500 billion (about 6 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product). 14
commissary accounts and phone calls, have to buy basic hygiene items and other
necessities for prisoners, and pay about $13,000 per prisoner in fines and fees).
10.

DAVID ROODMAN, THE IMPACTS OF INCARCERATION ON CRIME 77-119

&

(2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3635864 (analyzing
different studies regarding the aftereffects of incarceration); Daniel S. Nagin et
al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, in 38 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF
RESEARCH 115 (Michael Tonry ed., 2009) (evaluating research and concluding
that studies mildly point toward a criminogenic effect, though the research is
inconclusive); William D. Bales & Alex R. Piquero, Assessing the Impact of
Imprisonment on Recidivism, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 71, 98 (2012)
(finding, based on a study in Florida, that offenders released from prison
committed more crime than matched offenders released from community
programs); Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REV.
1049, 1082 ("[W]e can tentatively estimate that incarceration causes about 7
percent of total crime: 1 percent because of in-prison crime, 2 percent because of
prison-induced recidivism, and 4 percent because of the impact of incarceration
on the delinquency of inmates' children."). See generally Michael Tonry, Less
Imprisonment is No Doubt a Good Thing: More Policingis Not, 10 CRIMINOLOGY
& PUB. POL'Y. 137, 137-38 (2011) ("The effects of imprisonment on individual
deterrence are most likely perverse; people sent to prison tend to come out worse
and more likely to reoffend than if they had received a lesser
punishment.... [T]entative but not yet conclusive evidence indicates that
imprisonment is criminogenic and increases released inmates' rates of
reoffending.").
11. See, e.g., Press Release, Law Enft Leaders to Reduce Crime
Incarceration, Law Enforcement Leaders Urge President to Back Sentencing
Reform, Spurn More Incarceration as Part of Anti-Crime Agenda 1-2 (Feb. 13,
2017),
http://lawenforcementleaders.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/LELReport-Release.pdf.
12. See DAVID DAGAN & STEVEN E. TELES, PRISON BREAK: WHY
CONSERVATIVES TURNED AGAINST MASS INCARCERATION xi-xii, 2 (2016); Charlie

Savage, Trend to Lighten Harsh Sentences Catches on in Conservative States,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/us/13penal.html.
13. CHRISTINA HENRICHSON &RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUST., THE PRICE
OF PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 2 (Jules Verdone ed., 2012),

https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/price-of-prisons -whatincarceration-costs-taxpayers/legacy-downloads/price-of-prisons-updatedversion-021914.pdf; Lewis & Lockwood, supra note 9 ("The Bureau of Justice
Statistics estimates that the United States spends more than $80 billion each
year to keep roughly 2.3 million people behind bars.").
14. Michael McLaughlin et al., The Economic Burden of Incarcerationin the
U.S. 2, 4, 32 (Concordance Inst. for Advancing Soc. Just., Working Paper No.
CI072016, 2016), https://joinnia.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/The-EconomicBurden-of-Incarceration-in-the-US-2016.pdf.
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From a more philosophical perspective, both those who believe
punishment should focus on just desert and those who are more
utilitarian in orientation favor some degree of decarceration. 1 5
Whatever the reason, a consensus has built among policymakers that
reducing the number of people in prison is a critical objective, at least
if it can be done without increasing the danger to the public. 16
The public seems to agree. In a 2006 poll, only 38 percent of
respondents said that reducing the prison population was "very
important" as a stand-alone goal, while 81 percent stated it was "very
important" to ensure that "the punishment fits the crime."1 7 But by
2016, surveys showed that over 80 percent favored reduction of prison
populations as a primary goal of the criminal justice system. 18 And
when given more context, the public's attitudes toward incarceration
appear to be even more attuned to its negative aspects. In one 2012
PEW poll, 78 percent of respondents stated that it would be
acceptable to reduce prison time for low-risk, nonviolent offenders to
close budget deficits, 19 and over 80 percent believed that more money
should be spent on alternatives to prison for such offenders.20 Well
over a majority of respondents in the same poll endorsed the following
statement: "It does not matter whether a nonviolent offender is in
prison for 18 or 24 [or] 30 months . . . . What really matters is that
the system does a better job of making sure that when an offender

15. See generally Jessica Kelley & Arthur Rizer, Keep Calm and Carry on
with State Criminal Justice Reform, 32 FED. SENT'G. REP. 86 (2019) (describing
the purposes of criminal justice and the changes implemented by the First Step
Act in criminal justice reform); Tonry, supranote 10, at 138, 144.
16. See DAGAN & TELES, supranote 12, at xi-xiii (discussing the conservative
shift toward reducing the prison population); see also Justin McCarthy,
Americans' Views Shift on Toughness of Justice System, GALLUP (Oct. 20, 2016),
https://news. gallup.com/poll/196568/americans -views-shift-toughness-justicesystem.aspx; Paul Samuels & Gabrielle De La Gueronniere, Opinion, Candidates
Take Note: Strong BipartisanConsensus on Criminal Justice Reform, THE HILL
(Dec. 23, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/475732-candidatestake-note-strong-bipartisan-consensus-on-criminal-justice.
17. PRINCETON SUR. RSCH. ASSOCS. INT'L FOR THE NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CTS.,
THE NCSC SENTENCING ATTITUDES SURVEY 38 (2006).

18. See Holly Harris & Andrew Howard, Ryan's Victory Trumps Justice
Reform Opponents, THE HILL (Aug. 15, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits("[P]olling
blog/crime/291500-ryans-victory-trumps-justice-reform-opponents
data from dozens of states across the country shows overwhelming support across
the political and ideological spectrum for criminal justice reform."); Voters Want
Big Changes in Federal Sentencing, Prison System: Majority Supports Broad
Reforms for Drug Offenses, NationalPoll Finds, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Feb. 12,
2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/ 2016/02/12/
voters-want-changes-in-federal-sentencing-prison-system.
19.

PEW

CTR.

ON THE

STATES,

PUBLIC

CORRECTIONS POLICY IN AMERICA 4 (2012).

20.

Id. at 1, 4, 7.

OPINION

ON

SENTENCING

AND
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does get out, he is less likely to commit another crime." 21 In two polls
of Wisconsin citizens (a "purple" state) in 2012-2013, a majority of
respondents supported early release for both nonviolent and violent
offenders-at a point halfway through the sentence no less-if the
offender "can demonstrate that he is no longer a threat to society." 22
Several solutions to the mass incarceration problem have been
proposed and, in some states, have been implemented. Prominent
initiatives include shortening sentences either at the front end or
through early release, eliminating mandatory sentencing, creating
more alternatives to jail and prison, and supporting funding
initiatives prohibiting the use of state prisons for certain categories
of offenders, which in California created an incentive for localities to
develop cheaper options. 2 3 More radical proposals-such as those
subsumed under the Abolish Prison rubric-are unlikely to go
anywhere, but in today's protest-energized world are more than just
an academic pipedream and can at least provide baselines against
which to measure more modest reforms.
As both the poll data and the experience of reform states indicate,
however, substantial change in incarceration practices will not occur
unless politicians, government officials, and the public have
reasonable assurances that most of the individuals who are meant to
benefit from these types of reforms will not commit new serious
felonies. Even advocates for abolishing prisons always express the
important caveat that confinement needs to be retained for the
"dangerous few." 24 Those focused on civil liberties have an additional
concern. They worry that, to the extent these initiatives depend upon
the subjective judgments of judges and parole boards, the move
toward discretion-based sentences and intermediate dispositions will
not be evenly distributed, but rather will disfavor people of color or
others who fit certain stereotypes. 25
The key thesis of this Article is that risk assessment instruments
("RAIs")-statistically derived algorithms that estimate the risk of
reoffending posed by groups of offenders-can play a significant role

21. Id. at 5.
22. Michael O'Hear & Darren Wheelock, Imprisonment Inertia and Public
Attitudes Toward "Truthin Sentencing," 2015 BYU L. REV. 257, 276 (2015).
23. For a description of realignment and its impact, see Allen Hopper et al.,
Shifting the Paradigm or Shifting the Problem?: The Politics of California's
CriminalJustice Realignment, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 527, 554-93 (2014).
24. Allegra M. McLeod, PrisonAbolition and GroundedJustice, 62 UCLA L.
REv. 1156, 1168 (2015) ("Who and how many are the dangerous few? The answer
to this question is by no means self-evident but its complete and final resolution
ought not to interfere with serious engagement with abolitionist analysis .... ").
25. Cf Stephane Mechoulan & Nicolas Sahuguet, Assessing Racial
Disparitiesin ParoleRelease, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 49, 70 (2015) (finding that
parole boards that use actuarial instruments were not racially biased in their
decisions to release black and white prisoners).
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in assuaging both of these fears. 26 RAIs can help differentiate highrisk and low-risk offenders while at the same time constraining the
decisions that do so. In apparent recognition of these possibilities,
about half the states use RAIs in some fashion at the dispositional
stage or as a means of allocating correctional resources. 27
Despite their increasing prevalence, however, the full impact of
risk algorithms has yet to be either realized or adequately assessed.
That is because their use is, in every jurisdiction, entirely
discretionary. 28 In Virginia, for instance, a 2016 study found that
RAI-based sentencing recommendations were overridden in 40
percent of the cases; judges imprisoned 42 percent of those
recommended for alternatives to prison and permitted alternative
dispositions for 23 percent of those recommended for imprisonment. 29
Other researchers report similar dynamics. 3 0
From a decarceration perspective, that is unfortunate.
Researchers with bipartisan credentials
who audited the
compositions of the prison populations in three states estimated that,
if danger to the community were the only justification for continued
confinement, roughly half the prisoners would be released. 31 The

26. For an overview of risk assessment instruments, see HANDBOOK OF
VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT (Randy K. Otto & Kevin S. Douglas eds., 2d ed. 2020).
27. John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Redux: The Resurgence of Risk
Assessment in Criminal Sanctioning, 26 FED. SENT'G REP. 158, 159-60 (2014);
JENNIFER ELEK ET AL., USING RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT INFORMATION AT

SENTENCING: OBSERVATIONS FROM TEN JURISDICTIONS 8-9, 17-18, 31-38 (2015).

28. Generally, the statutes say that state officials should "consider" the risk
assessment results. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 532.007(3)(a) (2011) ("Sentencing
judges shall consider . . . the result[] of a defendant's risk and needs assessment
included in the presentence investigation .... "); OHIO REV. CODE § 5120.114
(2019) ("The department ... shall select a single validated risk assessment tool
for adult offenders" to be used by judges at sentencing, corrections officials at the
state and local levels, and parole officials); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.500 (2013)
("[T]he [sentencing] court may order the department [of corrections] to complete
a risk assessment report," which "[t]he court shall consider" before imposing a
sentence).
29. See Brandon L. Garrett et al., JudicialReliance on Risk Assessment in
Sentencing Drug and Property Offenders: A Test of the Treatment Resource
Hypothesis, 46 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 799, 807 (2019).
30. Sarah Brayne & Angele Christin, Technologies of Crime Prediction: The
Reception of Algorithms in Policingand CriminalCourts, SOC. PROBS. 1, 11 (2020)
("[M]ost judges and prosecutors did not typically rely on the risk scores at their
disposal.").
31.

ANNE MORRISON PIEHL ET AL., CTR. FOR CIVIC INNOVATION, RIGHT-SIZING

JUSTICE: A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF IMPRISONMENT IN THREE STATES 12 (1999);

also BERT USEEM & ANNE MORRISON PIEHL, PRISON STATE: THE CHALLENGE OF
MASS INCARCERATION 67 (2008) (concluding, based on three economic cost-benefit
studies of five state prison systems, that "[a]lthough it clearly pays on
incapacitation grounds alone to incarcerate those at the eightieth percentile [of
see
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Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs
("PATTERN"), the RAI developed in connection with the federal First
Step Act, adopts a very narrow definition of low risk, but it
nonetheless initially identified 48 percent of its sample population of
prisoners as "low" or "minimum" risk and thus eligible for early
release from their prison sentences. 32 In Virginia, RAIs designed to
recommend to judges who should be sentenced to prison alternatives
identified 63 percent of drug offenders and 43 percent of larceny and
fraud offenders as being low risk, with low risk defined as a 10-15
percent chance of recidivism within the next three years. 33
When offender risk and base rates for reoffending are not
quantified in this way, the tendency, at least in the United States, is
to opt for incarceration. In particular, judges and prosecutors who
are subject to election (which describes almost all state court judges
and prosecutors) and parole board members who owe their livelihoods
to fickle politicians have good reason to avoid appearing "soft" on
crime, given American cultural proclivities. 34 As David Ball's parsing
of the psychology literature shows, there is also "the human tendency
to desire certainty and simplicity;" Ball suggests that this desire,
which he attributes to judges as well as everyone else, "may help
explain why [our] default seems to be to keep someone locked up, 'just
in case'-and why this desire is resistant to information and
argument." 35

In contrast, the quantified results of well-validated RAIs can
provide a concrete, rational basis for diversion or release. If, as
recommended in this Article, adherence to those results is requiredin
most circumstances, the human urge to incapacitate those in the law's
grasp can be even more effectively resisted because decision-makers
must obey the objective facts. Evidence of such a dynamic comes from
Virginia, which found that judges using risk algorithms were willing
to reduce sentences even for sex offenders "when they can point to the

risk] in all five states, it does not appear to 'pay' to incarcerate those below the
median").
32.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: RISK AND NEEDS

ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 58 (2019), https://www.bop.gov/inmates/fsa/docs/the-firststep-act-of-2018-risk-and-needs-assessment-system.pdf.
33.

VA.

CRIM.

SENT'G

COMM'N,

2012

ANNUAL

REPORT

47

(2012),

www.vcsc.virginia.gov/2012VCSCAnnualReport.pdf.
34. See Christopher Slobogin, How Changes in American Culture Triggered
Hyper-Incarceration:Variations on the Tazian View, 58 How. L.J. 305, 320-21
(2015); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judgingthe Judiciary by the
Numbers: Empirical Research on Judges, 13 ANN. REv. L. & SOC. SCI. 203, 21011(2017).
35. W. David Ball, The Peter Parker Problem, 95 N.Y.U. L. REv. 879, 879
(2020).
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low risk-assessment score as a second opinion to support their
decision."36
For the same reasons, racial and other types of bias in decisionmaking about postconviction release can be significantly reduced if
the relevant cut-points have the force of law. Even if, as some claim,
RAIs are more likely to misclassify black people than white people as
high risk (a claim that this Article looks at closely), large numbers of
black people will still be classified as low risk. If that categorization
creates a presumption against incarceration, more people of color will
be eligible for release. 37 In contrast, a regime that is based on
intuitive or clinical judgments about who is "dangerous" is too easily
manipulated and prone to overly conservative outcomes influenced by
conscious or unconscious prejudices. Indeed, the available research
indicates that racial disparity becomes pronounced when, contrary to
the recommendation of this Article, legal decision-makers depart
from the risk algorithm. 38
RAIs can also help identify ways of ameliorating the risk of
offenders, whether they are released or confined. The old mantra that
"nothing works" in the battle against recidivism has been soundly
debunked. 39 As one 2008 review of the research summarized it: "The
global question of whether rehabilitation treatment works to reduce
recidivism has been answered in the affirmative by every metaanalyst who has conducted a systematic synthesis of a broad sample
of the available experimental and quasi-experimental research." 40
Ten years later, another meta-analysis of institutional programs
aimed at reducing the risk of adults confirmed that the recidivism of

36. MEGAN T. STEVENSON & JENNIFER L. DOLEAC, IZA INST. OF LAB. ECON.,
Ser. No. 12853, ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE HANDS OF HUMANS 20

(2019), http://ftp.iza.org/dp12853.pdf; see also Sarah Desmarais & Samantha A.
Zottola, Violent Risk Assessment: Current Status and Contemporary Issues, 103
MARQUETTE L. REv. 793, 804-07 (2020) (reporting research indicating that the
majority of studies show that RAIs, when implemented properly, reduce both use
of restrictive conditions and violent recidivism).
37. Kevin R. Reitz, The Compelling Case for Low-Violence-Risk Preclusionin
American PrisonPolicy, 38 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 207, 207 (2020).
38. Ben Green & Yiling Chen, Disparate Interactions: An Algorithm-in-theLoop Analysis of Fairness in Risk Assessments 3 (2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/19-fat.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8QAAHHL]; Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L.
REv. 303, 308-09 (2018); Jon Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions and Machine
Predictions, 133 Q.J. ECON. 237, 241 (2018).
39. See Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution
Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 243, 253-54 (1979)
(repudiating the author's earlier review of research, which had come to stand for
the proposition that "nothing works" in terms of reducing recidivism).
40. Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional
Rehabilitation:A Review of Systematic Reviews, 3 ANN. REV. L & SoC. SCI. 297,
306 (2007).
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adults was roughly 35 percent lower than those who are not treated. 41
In many types of cases, community-based programs are even more
RAIs that identify
effective at curbing violent behavior. 42
criminogenic needs can link individuals to the appropriate
programs.43
In theory, then, RAIs could bring significant benefits: First, fewer
people-of all ethnicities-would be put in jail prior to trial and in
prison after conviction. Second, for a substantial number of those who
are imprisoned, overall sentences would be shorter. Third, treatment
resources would be more efficiently allocated. Fourth, for these three
reasons, the capital outlays for prisons and jails would be
substantially less (although alternatives to prison, including good
treatment programs, would cost more). Fifth, the public would
continue to be protected, and perhaps would be even better protected,
from the most dangerous individuals. Sixth, lower-risk individuals
would be less subject to the well-documented criminogenic effects of
incarceration and better positioned to build and maintain a life
outside of jail or prison that does not involve criminal activity.
RAIs cannot fully realize these benefits, however, unless the
currently popular determinate sentencing structure that exists in
most states is dramatically altered. Today, determinate sentencing
states give almost all sentencing power to prosecutors, who in essence
fix the sentence range through charging practices, and judges, who
decide where within the range the sentence will fall and occasionally
select a sentence outside that range. 44 Even in states that technically
retain parole, the power of parole boards to affect sentences is very
circumscribed. 45 The result is that even an offender who poses a low
risk of reoffending will often receive a lengthy prison sentence.

41. Nina Papalia et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the Efficacy of
Psychological Treatments for Violent Offenders in Correctional and Forensic
Mental Health Settings, CLINICAL PSYCH.: SCI. & PRAC., June 2019, at 15,
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10. 1111/cpsp.12282.
42. BEYOND RECIDIVISM: NEW APPROACHES TO RESEARCH ON PRISONER
REENTRY AND REINTEGRATION 29 (Andrea Levenretz et al. eds., 2020). For a

description of several successful programs, and relevant data, see SHARON
MIHALIC ET AL., UNIV. COLO. BOULDER, CTR. FOR THE STUDY AND PREVENTION OF

VIOLENCE,

BLUEPRINTS

FOR VIOLENCE

PREVENTION

15-42,

56-58 (2004),

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/204274.pdf.
43.

D.A. ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT

242-43 (6th ed. 2017) (noting that most of these studies were carried out by the
developer of the treatment and that replications produced recidivism reduction
rates closer to 15 percent); BEYOND RECIDIVISM: NEW APPROACHES TO RESEARCH
ON PRISONER REENTRY AND REINTEGRATION,

supranote

42, at 26-27.

44. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 331 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("[I]n a world of statutorily fixed mandatory sentences for many crimes,
determinate sentencing gives tremendous power to prosecutors to manipulate
sentences through their choice of charges.").
45. See infra text accompanying note 48.
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Preventive justice-again, a sentencing scheme that limits the
prosecutor and judge to a determination of a sentence range, with the
ultimate sentence determined through risk assessments-would
restore power to parole boards.
The indeterminate sentencing
regimes of yesteryear, featuring broad sentence ranges and release
decision-making by politically appointed parole board members, were
much maligned, justifiably so in many respects.
Critics voiced
concerns about the incompetence of parole officials and the inaccuracy
of predictions, among other objections. 46 But if instead, parole boards
were composed of experts in risk assessment, used RAIs in their
assessments, and were required to release all but high risk offenders
at the end of the minimum sentence demanded by desert, a much
different type of indeterminate sentencing would exist-one that
would dramatically reduce the amount of time offenders spend in
prison, if they go to prison at all.
Even less refined parole schemes have produced such results.
Kevin Reitz has made the argument that much of our prison growth
since the 1990s has been in states with indeterminate systems
controlled by parole boards, which increasingly refused to release
prisoners who were eligible for parole. 47 But he does not mention the
fact that the same pressures that led to truth-in-sentencing,
mandatory
minima,
and
three-strikes
laws
also
made
"indeterminate" sentencing regimes much more determinate;
legislative initiatives in these jurisdictions significantly increased the
proportion of prisoners who are ineligible for parole, to anywhere from
45 to 93 percent. 48 And while parole boards are certainly vulnerable
to political pressures from governors and legislatures, that
malleability works both ways; Reitz's work acknowledges that before
the tough-on-crime movement in the 1980s and 1990s, parole boards
were much more willing to release prisoners early, 49 and that today

46.

Edward E. Rhine, The Present Status and Future Prospects of Parole

Boards and Parole Supervision, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND

CORRECTIONS 627, 630-32 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012) (detailing
criticism of parole boards, including that parole is "an inherently flawed concept
that should be abolished altogether").
47. Kevin R. Reitz, Don't Blame Determinacy: U.S. IncarcerationGrowth Has
Been Driven by Other Forces, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1795 (2006).
48. For instance, Reitz says that the top four "carceral powerhouses" were
"Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Georgia, all indeterminate jurisdictions." Id.
But all of these states significantly limit the proportion of the prison population
that is eligible for parole: Texas (55 percent), Louisiana (7 percent), Oklahoma
(17 percent) and Georgia (39 percent), and none of these states recognizes
presumptive parole (which requires automatic release if certain criteria are met).
See JORGE RENAUD, PRISON POL'Y INITIATIVE, FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE AN OPTION:
GRADING THE PAROLE RELEASE SYSTEMS OF ALL 50 STATES app. A (2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/parole-gradestable.html.
49. Kevin R. Reitz, Prison-ReleaseReform and American Decarceration,104
MINN. L. REv. 2741, 2745 (2020) ("During the thirty-five-year buildup
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the states that are leading the charge in the decarceration movement
are those with indeterminate sentencing.50 Expert parole board
decision-making constrained by RAIs should be able to do even better.
Part II of the Article provides more detail on this preventive
justice regime and illustrates how it both resembles and differs from
the indeterminate sentencing systems of yore. Parts III and IV
grapple with the controversies surrounding RAIs; although some
attention will be paid to complaints about the accuracy of these tools,
the bulk of the discussion will be about algorithmic fairness, which
has been the focus of most criticisms of RAIs. Part V calls on states
to experiment with preventive justice approaches. The hypothesis of
this Article, which needs to be given a fair test, is that a system of
preventive justice offers the single most potent, and most realistic,
mechanism for bringing about significant reform of the American
criminal punishment system.
II.

PREVENTIVE JUSTICE AND LIMITING

RETRIBUTIVISM

The term preventive justice, as used in this Article, refers to a
sentencing regime that adopts sentence ranges consistent with the

period,

... parole boards . .
became progressively more risk-averse in their
decision-making and ever more fearful of external scrutiny and condemnation.
Instead of using their release discretion as often as they had done in the earlier
twentieth century, parole boards transformed themselves into agencies of
'release-denial discretion."'). This is also why attempts to compare the effects of
"determinate" and "indeterminate" sentencing regimes are so conflicted.
Compare Don Stemen & Andres F. Rengifo, Policies and Imprisonment: The
Impact of Structured Sentencing and Determinate Sentencing on State
IncarcerationRates, 1978-2004, 28 JusT. Q. 174, 181-82 (2011) (reasoning that
studies often find conflicting results regarding these two regimes because they
incorrectly focus on the policy motivations rather than the policy structures), with
Yan Zhang et al., Indeterminate and Determinate Sentencing Models: A StateSpecific Analysis of Their Effects on Recidivism, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 693, 711
(2009) (obtaining mixed results and concluding that "the effects of different
sentencing models on reoffending may be largely contingent on . .. supervision
approaches . . . differing expertise of state parole boards, or differing crime
categories that are legislatively mandated").
50. Reitz, supra note 49, at 2775-76 ("[I]t is intriguing that indeterminate
states have had more than twice as much prison-rate decline as determinate
states in the post-growth period. This raises the possibility that the low-friction
quality of indeterminate prison-release systems could make it easier to reverse
course than in stickier determinate regimes."); Kevin R. Reitz, Prison-Release
Discretion and Prison Population Size State Report: Texas 7 (May 31, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) ("Texas is (undisputably) an
example of a jurisdiction with an extremely high degree of indeterminacy overall
in its framework for prison-release decision making, even when compared with
other paroling states. It is also (undisputably) an example of a state that has
dramatically reduced its imprisonment rate over the past 20 years in a nearly
continuous downward trend. Even without solid evidence of a causal linkage,
this is a brightly-colored flag that further inquiry is warranted.").
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offender's desert and then relies on expert parole boards to determine
the nature and duration of sentence within this range, based on
consideration of individual prevention goals (i.e., incapacitation,
specific deterrence, and rehabilitation) as measured through RAIs. 51
Such a system can alleviate many of the inherent tensions between
desert and prevention, between deontology and political reality, and
between the desire for community input and the allure of expertise.
If done properly, it should also significantly reduce prison
populations.
Preventive justice, so defined, is a form of what is often called
limiting retributivism. That concept is usually associated with
Norval Morris, who almost a half century ago wrote The Future of
Imprisonment.52 In that book, Morris proposed that retributivism
should play a "negative" role at sentencing. 53 In other words, a
person's desert or blameworthiness should act as a constraint on
sentencing, but not as a determinant of a particular sentence. As a
practical matter, this meant that desert would determine the range
of the sentence for particular crimes, but not the disposition in a
particular case. Rather, Morris argued, the specific sentence should
depend on other, utilitarian considerations-although, importantly,
in contrast to the sentencing schemes popular at the time and to
preventive justice, that sentence was to be set at the front end, not
determined by a parole board at the back end. 54 Sentences would also
be guided by what Morris called the "parsimony principle"-the idea,
endorsed both before and since by many commentators-that
punishment should be no more severe than necessary to carry out the
state's punishment purposes. 55 Morris's limiting retributivism has
often been called a "hybrid" approach that attempts to reconcile, or at
least combine, deontologically driven desert theory with the

51. I coined the phrase "preventive justice" in 2011 to refer to the type of
sentencing described in the text.
See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R.
FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT RISK: A PLEA FOR PREVENTIVE JUSTICE 6-7, 63-64
(2011). Other authors have used it in a pejorative sense, primarily as a synonym
for preventive detention.

See ANDREW ASHWORTH & LUCIA ZEDNER, PREVENTIVE

JUSTICE 144-45 (2014) (using the term as a synonym for preventative detention);
Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention:Preventive Justice in the World of John
Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 392 (1970).
52. See NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 75 (1974) (theorizing
that inflicted punishment should be no more severe than necessary and that,
even then, it is not obligatory to punish a criminal if utilitarian factors dictate
otherwise).
53. Id. at 73.
54. Id. at 47-49, 75.
55. Id. at 60-62; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 345 (R.
Hildreth trans., London, Trtibner & Co. 5th ed. 1887) (1802); RICHARD S. FRASE,
JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM 32-33

(2012).
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consequentialist goals of protecting the public and conserving public
resources.56
Morris's version of limiting retributivism, which was a reaction
to the indeterminate sentencing regimes that reigned at the time he
wrote, proved to be quite popular. A number of states adopted a
version of limiting retributivism beginning in the 1970s. 57 For
instance, in 1980, Minnesota created sentencing guidelines consistent
with Morris's view. 58 The state's guidelines have eleven categories of
sentences, which provide fairly narrow ranges (about 20 months) for
lower level felonies, and fairly broad ranges (about 120 months) for
higher level felonies. 59 The lower end of the most punitive category
approximates the higher end of the next most punitive category, the
lower end of the second most punitive category abuts the higher end
of the next category, and so on. Most lower-level felonies result in
imposition of sentences that are then suspended, at least for first time
offenders.
Numerous states have similar sentencing guidelines,
although many adopted ranges that were much smaller than
Minnesota's.6 0 The 2017 revisions to the sentencing provisions of the
Model Penal Code ("MPC") likewise call for numerous sentencing
categories defined by proportionate culpability.6 1 While the MPC
would permit risk assessments to influence the sentence if they are
based on "sufficiently reliable" tools, that input would be considered
by the judge, whose sentence would be determinate and set at the
front end, not subject to change by a parole board. 62
Like these other limiting retributivist schemes, the type of
preventive justice I propose would have sentencing categories based
on proportionate culpability. But it differs in three ways: First, given
the nebulousness of the culpability inquiry, the ranges would be fewer
and broader than in many versions of limiting retributivism. Second,
sentence length within the range would be determined by a parole
board at the back end, not by a judge at the front end. Third, the
focus of the parole board would be solely on risk and needs
assessment. Retributive (and general deterrence) concerns would be
solely legislative matters, integrated into the statutes governing

56. FRASE, supra note 55, at 82-85.
57. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in the States: Lessons for State
and FederalReformers, 6 FED. SENT'G REP. 123, 123 (1993) (noting that seventeen
states have adopted "presumptive sentencing rules").
58.

MINN. SENT'G GUIDELINES COMM'N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES

AND COMMENTARY 7 (2019), https://mn.gov/msgc-stat/documents/Guidelines/2019
/MinnSentencingGuidelines Commentary.pdf.
59. Id. at 79.
60. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003,
32 CRIME & JUST. 131, 206 (2005).
61. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §§ 1.02(2), 6.01, 6.11 (AM. L. INST.
2017).
62. Id. §§ 6.11, 9.08.
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sentence ranges. They would not inform sentences in individual
cases.
The model for preventive justice comes from the sentencing
provisions in the original Model Penal Code, which was promulgated
in 1962. The sentencing provisions in that version of the MPC
mandated only three broad sentencing ranges-for first-degree
felonies, one year up to life in prison (or up to twenty years, depending
on which version of the MPC was adopted); one to ten years for
second-degree felonies; and one to five years for third-degree felonies
-and in each case the one-year minimum could involve an alternative
to prison.63 The parole board determined the ultimate sentence
length, based primarily on individual prevention considerations. 64
The primary difference between the original MPC's approach and the
version of preventive justice sketched out here is that, in the latter
regime, RAIs would modernize the parole board determination.
Another difference is that, to give retributive goals sufficient due,
more sentencing categories would exist.
The various differences between preventive justice and other
forms of limiting retributivism can be fleshed out by looking more
closely at three issues: the determination of sentencing ranges, the
principles-constitutional
and otherwise-that would govern
preventive justice, and the nature of the parole board in a preventive
justice regime.
A.

The Determination of Sentence Ranges

The first goal in any limiting-retributivism regime, whether or
not mixed with risk assessment, is to set the sentence range for each
type of crime. At one end of the spectrum are scholars like Andrew
von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth, both retributivists, who believe
that "parity" in sentencing is crucial. They thus call for very narrow
sentence ranges based entirely on "the degree of harmfulness of the
conduct and the extent of the actor's culpability." 65 Although they
would allow "limited variations . . , say, in the range of 5-10 percent"
to permit non-prison alternatives and "back-up sanctions" for
offenders who violate probation or parole conditions, they argue that
preventive aims should never be grounds for deviation. 66 At the other
end of the spectrum is Morris, who apparently found acceptable very
wide ranges, akin to those associated with indeterminate regimes. At
least in his early writings, Morris held to the position that
blameworthiness is such a capacious construct that a given crime
could be associated with a large variety of sanctions that are, as he
63.
1962).
64.
65.

MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.02, 6.06 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft
See id. §§ 305.6-305.9.
See ANDREW

VON HIRSCH

& ANDREW ASHWORTH,

SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 144, 159 (2005).

66.

Id. at 161-62.
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put it, "not undeserved."6 7 In-between are writers like Richard Frase,
who endorses something akin to Minnesota's system of moderately
broad ranges. Frase thinks that Morris was too casual in his attitude
toward desert, but he also rejects the narrow ranges proposed by von
Hirsch and Ashworth, not only because he is willing to differentiate
between high and low risk offenders but also because he believes
broader ranges are necessary to encourage offender cooperation and
to provide leeway in meeting correctional priorities. 68
The wide ranges preferred by Morris make the most sense. Any
other approach ignores the hollowness of assigning specific
punishments to specific crimes. Von Hirsch and Ashworth admit as
much, conceding that "[t]here seems to be no crime for which one can
readily perceive a specific quantum of punishment as the uniquely
deserved one." 69 Nonetheless, they claim that precision is still
possible because consensus can at least be reached about the "ordinal"
ranking of crimes. 70 Thus, once the maximum "anchor" point (for
instance, life without parole) has been set, punishments can be
assigned according to their ranking, with the anchor point providing
the upper limit on punishment for the most serious crime and lesser
punishments assigned to lesser crimes. 71 The problem with this
approach is that consensus on desert is simply not possible. While
there is widespread agreement with respect to the ordinal rankings
of the most common crimes (such as homicide, rape, robbery, and
theft), outside of those core crimes, consensus over ordinal rankings
disappears. 72 More importantly, disagreement over the all-important
maximum anchor point can be significant; for instance, some might
favor the death penalty for murder, while others might prefer a
maximum sentence of fifteen years for such a crime. Finally, the
"spacing" between crimes on the ordinal scale can also be a matter of
serious dispute. 73

67.

NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 150-52 (1982).

68.

FRASE, supranote

69.

VON HIRSCH

55, at 29-30.

& ASHWORTH,

supra note 65, at 142.

70. Id. at 141-43.
71. Id. at 142.
72. See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordanceand Conflict in
Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REv. 1829, 1890-92 (2007).
73. In a study I conducted with Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, subjects were
asked to look at twelve crime scenarios describing only the actus reus and mens
rea for the crime, and then to indicate appropriate punishment on a thirteenpoint scale. Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, PuttingDesert
in its Place, 65 STAN. L. REv. 77, 94-96 (2013). Not surprisingly, agreement on
the proper punishment was virtually nonexistent. See id. at 95 tbl.2 (reporting
that for the "Control Group," which received scenarios describing the actus reus
and mens rea, standard deviations ranging from 3.109 to 7.373). And the range
of sentences was also broad, even when the extreme dispositions beyond two
standard deviations were thrown out. See id. (reporting, for example, ranges
from zero to four years for theft of a pie and from one day to the death penalty for
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Von Hirsch and Ashworth suggest that the ordinal ranking and
spacing questions can be addressed through analyzing the impact of
a given crime on the victim's "standard of living," a concept they
develop at some length. 74 But, as they acknowledge, "the impact of a
crime on the living standard is itself very much a matter of factual
and normative judgement" and in any event "is designed mainly to
address crimes directly affecting natural persons [e.g., homicide, sex,
and property crimes], rather than crimes involving collective
interests." 75
More importantly, the standard of living metric
addresses only the actus reus of the crime. Von Hirsch and Ashworth
suggest that the mental state component, which can be an extremely
important factor in determining desert for many crimes, instead "can
be gauged with the aid of clues from substantive criminal law
doctrine." 76
But, again, the parameters of an offender's
blameworthiness are highly debatable, and the ability to discern and
correctly label the relevant facts is far from perfect.
While these difficulties do not mean that we should not try to
reach conclusions about these matters, they do suggest that any
answers attained have a wide margin of error, which should be
reflected in sentencing ranges, akin to those found in the original
MPC. However, a bit more nuance is advisable if retributivist
instincts are to be given adequate weight. First, recall that minimum
felony sentences in the original MPC were all one year, regardless of
how serious the crime was, and that even a one-year sentence could
be served outside of prison.77 That outcome is too flexible if one takes
ordinal desert and the goal of differentiating the worst from the least
crimes seriously, and it is drastic enough that it could significantly
undermine the general deterrent impact of specific sentences, to the
extent that there is any. 78 Additionally, as Paul Robinson argues
from a consequentialist perspective, a punishment system that
departs too far from community sentiment may well lose legitimacy
and produce a populace more prone to take the law into its own hands
or to become noncompliant in other ways. 79 Although I have argued
a killing by pit bulls whose owner allowed them to escape). Further, in only the
least and most serious crime scenarios did more than 25 percent of the sample
choose the same punishment. See id.
74. VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supranote 65, at 143-46.
75. Id. at 146.
76. Id. at 144.
77. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.02, 6.06 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft
1962).
78. For a general critique of the conceptual and empirical basis of general
deterrence as a basis for determining criminal punishment, see Paul H. Robinson
& John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulationof Criminal Law
Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 950-51 (2003).
79. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. L.
REv. 453, 498 (1997) ("We conclude that desert distribution of liability happens
to be the distribution that has the greatest utility, in the sense of avoiding crime.
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that Robinson overstates the need for adhering strictly to societal
views on punishment,8 0 a default sentence of one year for a crime like
aggravated murder might well trigger the type of delegitimization he
describes. 8 1
Taking these considerations into account, a limiting retributivist
regime might adopt ranges for felonies like the following: ten to thirty
years for very serious crimes (such as, and perhaps only for,
aggravated murder), followed by four additional tiers of felonies, with
ranges of three to ten years (for lesser forms of intentional killing,
rape, and armed robbery), one to five years (for crimes like aggravated
assault), one to three years (for crimes like burglary) and up to one
year (for, e.g., the typical low-level drug sale crime). The minima and
maxima might be discounted for youth or for other concrete
mitigating circumstances (such as providing substantial assistance to
the authorities). They might also be extended for offenders who have
committed multiple crimes or for other concrete aggravating
circumstances, if that extension is justified solely on blameworthiness
grounds (with respect to risk, previous crimes should be given effect
only through an RAI).82 Further, the relevant time periods need not
be served in prison; perhaps for all but the first category, alternatives
to prison should be an option. Undoubtedly, many readers will
quibble (or perhaps more than quibble) over these ranges and
examples, which should bring home the fact that desert is highly
malleable; obviously, legislatures or sentencing commissions that
find these choices either too harsh or too lenient could modify them
accordingly.
While this type of adjustment to the minima and the addition of
two categories to the MPC's original three should alleviate the most
significant concerns about disproportionality, these modifications
would not address von Hirsch and Ashworth's concern about
disparate sentences. But, again, this objection assumes both that the
Thus, utility theorists ought to support liabilities assigned according to such a
desert-based system"); Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1948 (2010) (same).
80. Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, supra note 73, at 96-110 (describing
research debunking Robinson's assertion showing lack-of-compliance effects of an
empirical desert approach).
81. Id. at 118 (concluding, based on empirical findings, that "[w]here serious
crimes such as murder are involved, desert appears to play a much more
dominant role for a majority of people"); see also Dena M. Gromet & John M.
Darley, Restoration and Retribution: How Including Retributive Components
Affects the Acceptability of Restorative Justice Procedures, 19 Soc. JusT. RsCH.
395, 399 (2006) (finding that as crimes increase in seriousness, people are more
likely to require a retributive component).
82. On whether sentence enhancements based on prior crimes can be
justified on retributive grounds, see Julian V. Roberts & Orhun H. Yalincak,
Revisiting Prior Record Enhancement Provisions in State Sentencing Guidelines,
26 FED. SENT'G REP. 177, 177 (2014).
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desert of two different offenders can be rigorously measured and that
desert is the relevant metric for gauging parity. If instead it is taken
as a given that calibrating desert for a specific crime is an abstruse
exercise (consider, for instance, the many possible variations of
"armed robbery" and the people who commit it) and that the whole
point of limiting retributivism is to recognize that other criminal
justice considerations besides desert may legitimately be considered
in fashioning sentences, this concern is appreciably diminished.
That is not to say that parity is not an important goal. For
instance, as developed below, offenders with similar risk levels should
be treated similarly, regardless of other characteristics.
More
generally, the existence of wide sentence ranges and specific
sentences based on nondesert considerations should not lead to the
conclusion that sentencing can be "lawless," the term Judge Frankel
famously affixed to indeterminate regimes. 8 3 Several principles,
some of them arguably of constitutional status, should govern a
preventive justice version of limiting retributivism.
B.

GoverningPrinciplesof Preventive Justice

The first principle of a preventive justice version of limiting
retributivism involves the desert component rather than the
prevention component, and it would be straightforward: to satisfy the
retributive goal, the minimum sentence required by desert must be
served. For most misdemeanors and many lower level felonies (those
in the final three of the five categories proposed above), this sentence
might often consist of nonincarcerative restrictions in the community,
such as community service and restitution; here, attention should be
paid to the fact that some types of community restrictions can have
as much "punitive bite" as short prison sentences. 84 Frase argues, as
did Henry Hart before him, 85 that the censure associated with a
criminal conviction and these types of dispositions can satisfy desert
demands at the lower end of the criminal scale. 86 Several other
commentators, including von Hirsch and Ashworth, have recognized

83. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 3-11
(1973) (criticizing indeterminate sentencing and stating, inter alia, that
"legislatures have not done the most rudimentary job of enacting meaningful
sentencing 'laws'," and that, as a result, sentencing judges and parole officials
exercised broad discretion and wielded enormous sentencing power "effectively
subject to no law at all").
84. Robert E. Harlow et al., The Severity of Intermediate Penal Sanctions: A
Psychophysical Scaling Approach for Obtaining Community Perceptions, 11 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 71, 87 (1995).

85. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 427 (1958).
86. FRASE, supranote 55, at 31.
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that retributive goals can be achieved through nonincarcerative
alternatives. 87
Furthermore, once granted, probation or parole should be
revoked only if an individual's risk category changes. In some
jurisdictions, almost half of all prison admissions are for parole
violations that can consist of very minor violations having nothing to
do with the degree of risk that ought to be the basis for detention. 88
In a preventive justice regime, those types of detentions would be
impermissible.
However, for more serious crimes (certainly those in the first
category and perhaps most of those in the second), probably no
community-based condition would satisfy desert, in which case the
presumptive sentence would be incarceration for the minimum period
of the relevant sentencing range. Frase argues in favor of the practice
in many states of making the default sentence the middle of the
range, so that judges can depart upward or downward and still stay
within desert-based bounds.89 But if, as we are assuming, any
sentence within the range satisfies desert, the parsimony principlewhich writers like Morris, Tonry, and Frase himself all endorse (as
does the revised MPC) 9 0-dictates that the minimum sentence is the
place to start. Building on the idea that culpability is a hopelessly
vague concept, Jacob Bronsther has also concluded "that
retributivism can only justify the least harmful 'not undeserved'
sentence."91
The parsimony principle, reinforced by constitutional doctrine,
would also govern the role of risk assessment and risk management.
Almost fifty years ago, the Supreme Court decided Jackson v.

87. VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 65, at 156-59.
88. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, REVOKED: How PROBATION AND PAROLE FEED
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2020), https://www.hrw.org/report/

2020/07/31/revoked/how-probation-and-parole-feed-mass -incarceration-unitedstates (finding, in a study of three states, that this is the case in Pennsylvania
and further noting that "most people locked up for supervision violations were
not convicted of new offenses-rather, they were incarcerated for breaking the
rules of their supervision, such as for using drugs or alcohol, failing to report
address changes, or not following the rules of supervision-mandated programs.
Of those who were incarcerated for new offenses, in our focus states, many were
for conduct like possessing drugs; public order offenses such as disorderly conduct
or resisting arrest; misdemeanor assaultive conduct; or shoplifting."). On the
degree of risk required, see infra text accompanying note 260.
89. FRASE, supranote 55, at 52.
90. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final
Draft 2017) (providing that sentences may be "no more severe than necessary").
91. Jacob Bronsther, Vague Comparisons and ProportionalSentencing, 25
LEGAL THEORY 26, 26 (2019). Also known as Ockam's Razor, the parsimony
principle emphasizes that the simplest solution is often the correct one. Elliott
Sober, The Principleof Parsimony, 32 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 145, 145-46 (1981).
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Indiana,92 involving a successful challenge to the prolonged detention
of an individual who had been found permanently incompetent to
stand trial. 93
In concluding that Jackson's detention was
unconstitutional, the Court declared that the Due Process Clause
requires that the "nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation[ship] to [its] purpose." 94 This pronouncement,
repeated in several subsequent Supreme Court decisions, 95 has at
least three implications for any sentence based on a prevention
rationale of the type at issue here.
First, Jackson can be read to require, consistent with the
parsimony principle, that any government deprivation of liberty in
the name of prevention be the last drastic means of achieving the
state's preventive aim. 96 That would mean, for instance, that once
the desert minimum has been met, there should be a presumption of
release, rebuttable only by proof that the person poses a significant
risk of reoffending-a proposition some lower courts have adopted. 97
Similarly, even if the individual is incarcerated and considered high
risk when the minimum expires, community-based programs should
be the presumptive disposition unless they cannot adequately protect
the public. While imprisonment might substantially reduce risk, it
may not be any more effective at doing so than placement in a
substance abuse treatment program in the community, a vocational
training program in a halfway house, or a job-release program
coupled with an ankle monitor. Jackson's parsimony principle
requires consideration of such options. 98
92. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
93. Id. at 717-19.
94. Id. at 738.
95. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001) (citing Jackson and indicating
that residents of a commitment facility may have a claim for release if they are
not receiving treatment); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78-79 (1992) (citing
Jackson, and holding that a person acquitted by reason of insanity may not be
committed as dangerous without a showing of mental illness); Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (citing Jackson and holding that "the State is
under a duty to provide respondent with such training as an appropriate
professional would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his
ability to function free from bodily restraints").
96. Christopher Slobogin, Preventionas the Primary Goal of Sentencing: The
Modern Case for IndeterminateDispositions in Criminal Cases, 48 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 1127, 1138-39 (2011) (arguing that, if the government's objective is to
prevent harm, "confinement may occur only if necessary to achieve prevention of
harm and may continue only if it remains necessary to achieve that aim").
97. See Carrillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 771-73 (Minn. 2005) (holding
that postponing release beyond the initial parole determination is "a significant
departure from the basic conditions of the inmate's sentence" and that "under the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, [a prisoner] has a
protected liberty interest in his [presumptive] release date that triggers a right
to procedural due process before that date can be extended").
98. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.
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Second, Jackson means that the government must provide
rehabilitative services if they will reduce the length of the
intervention, because otherwise the confinement is not the least
restrictive way of accomplishing the state's aim. 99 In other words,
whether or not a state provides such services during the phase of
punishment that is designed to meet the desert-based minimum,
Jackson mandates a right to ameliorative treatment if a sentence is
prolonged past the minimum because of a risk assessment. It is
unlikely that this principle could be transformed into an affirmative
duty on the part of the state to create treatment services.10 0 But it
could create an incentive to provide at least those services that are
available, because the state will know release is the alternative. In
Kansas r. Hendricks,10 1 the Supreme Court held that where
incapacitation is the goal, treatment need not occur if it is not
"available" or "possible," but suggested that if available treatment is
not offered, continued preventive detention would violate due
process.1 0 2 In Seling r. Young,103 the Court made the same point.10 4
Admittedly, both of these cases involved postsentence "civil"
commitment of sex offenders on dangerousness grounds.10 5 But in a
preventive justice regime, the portion of a sentence that occurs after
the minimum is served is based solely on risk and criminogenic needs.
If treatment of needs is reasonably possible, it should be provided.
Finally, Jackson's reasonable relationship requirement means
that any confinement that occurs should be proportionate to the risk,
and that the longer the intervention extends, the greater the proof of
risk that must be shown (a precept that could be called risk
proportionality, analogous to desert proportionality).1 06
This
principle should mean that individuals considered to be low risk or at
risk of committing only minor crimes should never be detained for

99.

Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the

Involuntary Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators,35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 358
(2003) (" [T]he Jackson line of cases suggests a strong right to treatment, one in
which effective treatment facilitates real progress toward community re-entry.").
100. But see Thomas S. v. Morrow, 601 F. Supp. 1055, 1059 (W.D.N.C. 1984)
(holding that the Constitution was violated when the state provided only any
available treatment, rather than "the appropriatetreatment").
101. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
102. Id. at 367 ("[T]he State has a statutory obligation to provide 'care and
treatment for [persons adjudged sexually dangerous] designed to effect
recovery."') (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986)).
103. 523 U.S. 250 (2001).
104. Id. at 265 (stating that, if the purpose of a civil commitment statute is
"to incapacitate and to treat ... due process requires that the conditions and
duration of confinement under the [statute] bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which persons are committed").
105. Id. at 255-58; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 353-56.
106.

CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE

WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 143-50 (2006).
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preventive purposes. Even individuals considered to be high risk
could not be confined for prolonged periods of time without
increasingly higher showings of risk (and again, no one could be
detained beyond the retributively determined maximum sentence). 10 7
Thus, a high risk of serious crime should be required to prolong the
sentence for any significant amount of time, and risk would have to
be reassessed periodically.
Morris was reticent about allowing risk assessment to influence
sentences because of the legitimate concern that assessing a person's
dangerousness while in prison may not reflect his or her
dangerousness outside of it.108 But risk assessment done correctly
looks at preprison information as well as at participation and
completion of programs while in prison, as the PATTERN does.10 9
Moreover, individuals who are not high risk or who appear to be
manageable in the community despite their high risk can be
evaluated outside the prison setting; in particular, conditional release
programs can facilitate efforts to assess risk within community
settings.110
Unlike desert, risk is not a static variable. Setting a determinate,
unchangeable sentence, whether at the front end or at the expiration
of the minimum sentence, is inconsistent with a risk-oriented regime.
Within the desert-based maximum, the outer boundary of a sentence
in a preventive justice regime would be determined by periodic
assessments of an offender's risk, risk which, because of the
parsimony principle, would need to be increasingly more serious to
authorize prolonging the intervention.
C.

Parole as a ConstitutionalRight

From the foregoing, it should be clear that the parole board is
crucial in a preventive justice regime.
One of the reasons
indeterminate sentencing fell into disfavor was the documented
tendency of parole boards to act in a biased, arbitrary manner.11 1 As
Steven Chanenson put it, "[p]arole release has historically been an
unstructured and wildly discretionary power, subject to the same
kinds of irrationalities and abuses that afflict old-style, fully
discretionary judicial sentencing on the front end."112

107. See id.; Slobogin, supra note 96, at 1135-37.
108. MORRIS, supranote 52, at 35-36.
109. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., supra note 32, at 44-45.
110. Conditional release programs have long been a mainstay of preventive
detention for people found not guilty by reason of insanity. See, e.g., Jeffrey
Rogers et al., After Oregon's Insanity Defense: A Comparison of Conditional
Release and Hospitalization, 5 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 391, 392 (1982).
111. See Ghandnoosh, supra note 7, at 141.
112. Steven L. Chanenson, Guidancefrom Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REV.
175, 187 (2005); Kevin R. Reitz, Questioning the Conventional Wisdom of Parole
Release Authority, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 199, 228 (Michael Tonry ed.,
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However, if parole boards are conceived of as part of the risk
assessment and management team, they would look and act quite
differently than the parole boards Chanenson describes. Not only
would they rely on modern risk assessment, but they would also be
composed primarily of experts in risk-needs assessment, rather than
laypeople and correctional officials.113 Furthermore, rather than the
wide-ranging power typically granted such boards, which are usually
permitted to consider retributive and general deterrence objectives as
well as risk, 114 the parole board in a preventive justice regime would
focus entirely on individual prevention goals.
A potential obstacle to making the parole board the centerpiece
of a sentencing system is the Supreme Court's stance, dating from the
1980s, that there is no constitutionally recognized right to a parole
hearing, much less parole release upon specified criteria. 115 Nor is
there a right to counsel, witnesses, or cross-examination at any
hearing that takes place. 116 Thus, there is the danger that a state will
adopt a preventive regime but fail to provide the primary mechanism
for making it work-an expert, formal parole decision-making
process.
In the past twenty-five years, however, a number of Supreme
Court decisions have provided a basis for changing this situation,

&

Oxford Univ. Press 2004) (noting that parole boards have a history of poor process
and patronage appointments); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 126-33 (1976) (calling the federal parole board
the most disappointing agency the author had ever encountered).
113. See Stefan J. Bing, Note, Reconsidering State ParoleBoardMembership
Requirements in Light of Model Penal Code Sentencing Revisions, 100 KY. L.J.
871, 888 (2012) (arguing that, given the movement toward evidence-based
sentences, parole boards, should include "social scientists in the fields of
sociology, psychology, or statistics"); see also Edward E. Rhine, Joan Petersilia
Kevin R. Reitz, The Future of Parole Release, 46 CRIME & JUST. 279, 283 (2017)
(arguing the same, although contrary to the proposal here, limiting the parole
board to a single decision at the end of the minimum sentence, and capping a
sentence enhancement to an amount equal to 25-33 percent of the maximum
allowable sentence for the offense, the upper end of the relevant range, or fifteen
years, whichever comes first).
114. W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate
Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 893, 903-04
(2009) (stating that "[n]one of the due process cases limits the parole board's
authority to its core institutional competence-measuring an offender's threat to
public safety-and parole boards can therefore find facts that sound in both
retribution and dangerousness" and finding that, in California, parole boards
routinely do so).
115. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1983) ("[T]here is no
'constitutional or inherent right' to parole .... " (citations omitted)); Conn. Bd. of
Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (observing that there is no
constitutional entitlement to parole).
116. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15
(1979).
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both substantively and procedurally. In Graham v. Florida,117 the
Court held unconstitutional a mandatory life without parole sentence
for juveniles who commit homicide, 118 and in Miller v. Alabama,119 it
extended that ruling to bar all mandatory life without parole
sentences for juveniles. 120 The Court's rationale for these decisions
turned in large part on its assessment of the ways in which
mandatory life sentences are inconsistent with the goals of
punishment, two of which-incapacitation and rehabilitationvirtually require parole hearings. As the Graham Court explained:
Even if the State's judgment that Graham was incorrigible were
later corroborated by prison misbehavior or failure to mature,
the sentence was still disproportionatebecause that judgment
was made at the outset.
A life without parole sentence
improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate
growth and maturity. Incapacitation cannot override all other
considerations, lest the Eighth Amendment's rule against
disproportionate sentences be a nullity....
[Nor can a] sentence of life imprisonment without parole . . . be
justified by the goal of rehabilitation. The penalty forswears
altogether the rehabilitative ideal. By denying the defendant
the right to reenter the community, the State makes an
irrevocable judgment about that person's value and place in
society. This judgment is not appropriate in light of a juvenile
nonhomicide offender's capacity for change and limited moral
culpability. 121
The Court concluded: "A State need not guarantee the offender
eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide
him or her with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the
end of that term." 122
Of course, Graham and Miller made clear they were limiting
their reach to mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles.
They were not addressing other types of mandatory sentences nor
adult sentencing. But once an offender has served the minimum
demanded by retributive and deterrence objectives, the Court's
concern about the irreconcilability of irrevocable sentences with the
incapacitative and rehabilitative goals of punishment logically affects
adult sentences as well. As Richard Bierschbach argues,
Graham recognized the significance of parole-and, implicitly,
back-end sentencing generally-to the constitutional regulation
117. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
118. Id. at 82.
119. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
120. Id. at 489.
121. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 82.
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of punishment.... If taken seriously, Graham's view of parole
could result in more textured, considered, and just sentences,
ones that seek not only to deter and condemn but also to further
restoration, reconciliation, and other soft but important values
the Court saw as being bound up in parole. 123
Parole review should also be relatively frequent for those
offenders who are not released at the end of the minimum term and
for those who are subject to supervision after release. In Garner v.
Jones,124 the Supreme Court held that a prolonged hiatus between
parole hearings violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it "create[s] a
significant risk of increased punishment" relative to the sentence
contemplated at the time of sentencing. 125 If a judge sentences an
offender to an indefinite term that presumptively ends when the
minimum is reached, as proposed here, a failure of the parole board
to conduct frequent periodic reviews after that point could violate that
rule. That notion is bolstered by the Supreme Court's decision in
Kansas v. Hendricks.12 6
In upholding the constitutionality of
postsentence
commitment
of sexually
violent
offenderscommitments based entirely on the offender's risk, just as those in a
preventive regime would be after the minimum sentence is servedHendricks indicated that "constitutional provisions for care and
treatment" require release when the offender is no longer dangerous
and noted that the statute in question effectuated that rule by
entitling those committed to "annual review to determine whether
continued detention was warranted." 127
Even if all of this is conceded, parole boards still might not
provide much in the way of review if the procedures remain as anemic
as they have been historically. Assuming the prescriptions advanced
later in this Article are followed, most questions about RAIs should
be settled jurisdiction-wide, so that case-by-case litigation on
generalizable aspects of risk assessment would not be necessary.
Nonetheless, procedural injustice is still likely unless offenders are
afforded a more robust adversarial process than currently exists, one

123. Richard Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1745, 1788 (2012); see also Flores v. Stanford, 18 CV 2468 (VB), 2019 WL
4572703, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2019) (holding that, assuming that parole
board members "'have denied, and continue to deny, juvenile lifers release to
parole supervision based only on the crime committed or juvenile criminal
history,' and 'despite clear evidence of rehabilitation and maturity,"' a plausible
Eighth Amendment violation has been alleged).
124. 529 U.S. 244 (2000).
125. Id. at 255 (stating that a prisoner must show that a rule prolonging a
time in prison without a parole hearing "created a significant risk of increasing
his punishment").
126. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
127. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
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that meaningfully enables them to challenge inaccurate information
or improper adjustments to the RAI.
Once again, Supreme Court caselaw-this time going back
almost fifty years-might provide a wedge, given the fact that, in a
preventive justice regime, the offender is entitled to release at the
completion of the minimum sentence unless the board determines he
or she poses a high risk of reoffending. Under these circumstances,
the parole determination is more akin to the determination made at
a parole revocation hearing. In Morrissey v. Brewer,128 the Court
required much more process at such proceedings, including the rights
to notice, to be present, to proffer witnesses and documentary
evidence, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to
obtain "a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied
on and reasons for revoking parole."1 29 And in a later case, the Court
held that individuals subject to parole and probation revocation
proceedings also have a right to counsel when "a disputed issue can
fairly be represented only by a trained advocate."1SO That will almost
always be true at the initial parole hearing when the results of the
first postconviction RAI are considered, and in many cases at
subsequent hearings as well, especially if the claim is that Jackson's
dictates are being violated. 131
The resources for this more formal parole process could come
from the decline in appeals of judicially imposed sentences. Such a
decline is highly likely in a preventive justice regime because,
whether the result of a guilty plea or the judge's decision after a trial,
the sentence will be vulnerable only in the unlikely event the judge
picks the wrong sentencing range. Thus, resources that today are
devoted to sentence appeals-which can be numerous, especially in
determinate sentencing systems 132-can be transferred to parole
hearings and appeals of parole board decisions in a preventive justice
regime. Appellate courts presumably would defer to board decisions
in most cases, especially if the board relies on an RAI approved by the
128. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
129. Id. at 489.
130. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973).
131. See Flores v. Stanford, 18 CV 2468 (VB), 2019 WL 4572703, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2019) (holding that a due process claim is stated when
"[p]arole [b]oard commissioners commonly do not even read such offenders' files
before conducting parole interviews or making parole determinations; make
parole determinations based at least in part on a risk assessment algorithm the
workings of which no defendant knows or understands; predetermine parole
outcomes before conducting parole interviews; and pay no attention to other
commissioners' questions and offenders' answers during interviews").
132. WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., 6 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.3(g) (4th ed. 2019)
(noting that appeals of sentences in indeterminate regimes were rare, but that
"[w]ith the advent of presumptive sentencing and guideline sentencing, the
landscape of appellate sentencing review in this country was altered
dramatically").
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relevant jurisdiction-wide authority. But they could reverse a board's
decision when it is arbitrary and capricious because it clearly violates
Jackson or the principles governing RAIs outlined in Parts III and IV
below.
The final piece of the preventive justice puzzle is staffing the
parole board and establishing its decision-making process. Since the
sole function of the board is to assess risk as a predicate for
determining whether release should occur and, if so, under what
circumstances, the board should be composed primarily of experts on
risk assessment and risk management. The type of board proposed
by Rhine, Reitz, and Petersilia fits the bill. Their board would consist
of people recommended by a nonpartisan panel and include expert
criminologists and professionals versed in risk assessment. 133
To assist in that endeavor, the board must have access to results
from RAIs. For the reasons already canvassed, this last feature is
crucial. 134 Without RAIs, risk assessment is a guessing game. With
RAIs, legal decision-makers can identify the small group of
individuals who have a significant likelihood of committing violent
crime in the future in the absence of confinement, with the aim of
releasing everyone else at the end of their minimum sentence. But
explaining why and how that would work requires a significant
amount of background.
III.

THE USEFULNESS OF RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS

Despite their potential advantages, the risk algorithms used in
the criminal justice system today are highly controversial. A common
claim is that they are not good at what they purport to do, which is to
identify who will offend and who will not, who will be responsive to
rehabilitative efforts and who will not be. But the tools are also
maligned as racially biased, dehumanizing, and, for good measure,
antithetical to the foundational principles of criminal justice. A
sampling of recent article and book titles illustrates the point:
"Impoverished Algorithms:
Misguided Governments,
Flawed
Technologies, and Social Control,"135 "Risk as a Proxy for Race: The
Dangers of Risk Assessment,"136 and Automating Inequality: How
High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor.137 In 2018, over
110 civil rights groups signed a statement calling for an end to

133. Rhine et al., supranote 113, at 283.
134. See discussion supra Subparts I & II.C.
135. Sarah Valentine, Impoverished Algorithms: Misguided Governments,
Flawed Technologies, and Social Control, 46 FORDHAMURB. L. J. 364 (2019).
136. Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk
Assessment, 27 FED. SENT'G REP. 237 (2015).
137. VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: How HIGH-TECH TOOLS
PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018).
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pretrial RAIs. 138 That same year, twenty-seven academics stated that
"technical problems" with RAIs "cannot be resolved."139 And in 2020,
another group of 2,435 scholars from a wide range of disciplines
"demanded" that the Springer publishing company "issue a statement
condemning the use of criminal justice statistics to predict
criminality" because of their unscientific nature. 140
These claims have some basis in fact, but they can easily be
overblown. And if the impact of these criticisms is to prevent the
criminal justice system from using algorithms, a potentially valuable
means of reform will be lost. A key argument in favor of algorithms
is comparative in nature. While algorithms can be associated with a
number of problems, alternative predictive techniques may well be
much worse in each of these respects. Unstructured decision-making
by judges, parole officers, and mental health professionals is
notoriously bad, biased, reflexive, and often reliant on stereotypes
and generalizations that ignore the goals of the system. 14 1 Algorithms
can do better, at least if subject to certain constraints.
This Part of the Article addresses complaints that RAIs are
unlikely to be useful at sentencing, while Part IV focuses on claims
that, even if they are useful, they are unjust. After describing RAIs
in more detail, this Part of the Article briefly describes the requisites
they should meet to help in the postconviction setting. If risk is a
legal issue, which it often is in today's sentencing regimes and would
definitely be in a preventive justice regime, RAIs could, in theory,
provide crucial input for legal decision-makers. But, in fact, RAIs can
only do so if the information they provide about risk is, to use
evidentiary terminology, both "material" (logically related to the
questions the law asks) and "probative" (sufficiently accurate about
the information it provides). Further, and most importantly, if
optimal value is to be obtained from such an RAI, its results should
be treated as presumptively dispositive on the issue of risk.

138.

THE LEADERSHIP

CONF. EDUC. FUND,

THE USE OF PRETRIAL "RISK

ASSESSMENT" INSTRUMENTS: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS 1,

10
(2018),
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-RiskAssessment-Full.pdf.
138. CHELSEA BARABAS ET AL., TECHNICAL FLAWS OF PRETRIAL RISK
ASSESSMENTS RAISE GRAVE CONCERNS 4-6 (2019), https://dam-prod.media.mit.

edu/x/2019/07/16/TechnicalFlawsOfPretrialML%20site.pdf; Chelsea Barabas et
al., The Problems with Risk Assessment Tools, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/opinion/pretrial-ai.html.
140. Coal. for Critical Tech., Abolish the #TechtoPrisonPipeline, MEDIUM
(June 23, 2020), https://medium.com/@CoalitionForCriticalTechnology/abolishthe-techtoprisonpipeline-9b5b 14366b 16.
141. Mirko Bagaric et al., Erasing the Bias Against Using Artificial
Intelligence to PredictFuture Criminality:Algorithms Are Color Blind and Never
Tire, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 1037, 1057-58, 1063-67 (2020).
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The Nature of Risk Assessment Instruments

John Monahan and Jennifer Skeem have provided a helpful
typology of "risk assessment." 142 That term encompasses a number of
different practices that differ in the extent to which they: (1) rely on
empirically valid risk and protective factors, (2) use a structured
method for measuring these risk and protective factors, (3) establish
a procedure for combining scores on the individual risk and protective
factors into a total score, and (4) produce a final estimate of risk.
Clinical risk assessment-in many settings, the traditional and stilltypical method used by many judges, parole boards, and mental
health professionals-structures none of these components; rather,
an estimate of risk is based on experience and perhaps intuition, and
the factors considered may vary from case to case and be applied
differently in different cases. 143 Checklist risk assessment provides
structure on the first component by listing the factors that should be
considered. 144
Structured professional judgment ("SPJ") risk
assessment satisfies the first two components by providing a list of
factors and indicating how they should be measured (e.g., on a scale
of 0-2) but avoids combining these measures for a total score, instead
counselling that the item ratings be considered merely in arriving at
an overall conclusion about risk. 145
Adjusted actuarial risk
assessment lists the factors, describes how they should be measured,
and produces a total score, but allows evaluators to adjust or modify
the score based on clinical judgment that is not structured by the
instrument. 146 Stand-alone actuarial risk assessment does not
permit such adjustments, but rather produces a probability estimate
that is considered final.1 47
The term "risk assessment instruments" applies only to the last
three types of practices. 148 Consider these four examples. The
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide-Revised ("VRAG"), is an actuarial RAI
relied on extensively in Canada and in several jurisdictions within
the United States, mostly in connection with sentencing. 149 It

142. John Monahan & Jennifer Skeem, Introductory Discussion of the
Science-Research Approaches in Violence Risk Assessment, in 2 MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 9:11 (20192020 ed.).
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment and Risk Management in
Juvenile Justice, 27 CRIM. JUST. 10, 12 (2013).
147. See id. at 11-12.
148. See Monahan & Skeem, supranote 142, § 9.11.
149. For a description of the instrument and relevant research, see Grant T.
Harris et al., Prospective Replication of the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide in
Predicting Violent Recidivism Among Forensic Patients, 26 LAw & HUM. BEHAv.
377, 378-79 (2002).
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contains twelve largely static risk factors, having to do with the
individual's score on the Psychopathy Checklist (a measure of
psychopathy that takes into account criminal history), elementary
school misconduct, diagnosis (with personality disorders positively
correlated with risk and-perhaps surprisingly-schizophrenia
negatively correlated), age, presence of parents in home before age
sixteen, performance on conditional release, nonviolent offenses,
marital status, victim injury, victim gender, and history of alcohol
abuse. 150 The evaluator assigns a numerical subscore in connection
with each risk factor and then adds the subscores to determine a total
score that can range from less than negative twenty-one to more than
twenty-eight. 15 1 Initial research associated the lowest score on the
VRAG with a 0 percent chance of violent offending within seven years,
and the highest score with a 100 chance of violent offending within
that period; seven other "bins" or ranges are associated with
recidivism probabilities of 8 percent to 76 percent. 152
A much slimmer actuarial RAI, called the Non-Violent Risk
Assessment ("NVRA"), is used in Virginia. 153 The NVRA actually
consists of several RAIs, utilizing a separate tool for different
categories of crime. For instance, if the crime of conviction is fraud,
the instrument relies on just five static factors: offender age at the
time of the offense (twenty-two points if the offender is younger than
twenty-one), offender gender (ten points for males; one point for
females), prior adult felony convictions (ten points if more than three
convictions), prior adult incarcerations (four points if one to nine;
thirty-two points if more than ten), and legal restraints (e.g.,
probation) at the time of conviction (six points). 154 If an offender
receives more than thirty points on this instrument, prison is
recommended; otherwise, the tool counsels the judge to consider
"alternative punishment." Note that on this instrument, a young
male receives a prison recommendation if he has one prior felony
155
conviction before the offense of conviction.

150. Id. at 378.
151. See id. at 385 tbl.2.
152. See id.
153. For a description of the original instruments and some data on their
implementation, see Richard P. Kern & Meredith Farrar-Owens, Sentencing
Guidelines with Integrated Offender Risk Assessment, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 165,
169 (2004) ("The non-violent risk assessment tool adapted as part of the
discretionary sentencing guidelines serves to safely divert a significant share of
low-risk felons away from expensive prison beds into less costly alternative
punishment programs.").
154.

BRANDON L. GARRETT ET AL., NONVIOLENT RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA

SENTENCING: THE SENTENCING COMMISSION DATA 15 (2018), https://www.law.

virginia. edu/system/files/news/spr18/UVA%2Law%20NVRA%2OSentencing%2
OAnalysis%20and%2OJudicial%2OSurvey%2C%2OMarch%201%2C%202018.pdf.
155. Id.
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A third, more complicated instrument is the Correctional
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions tool
("COMPAS").156 It can be used either as an actuarial RAI or an
adjusted actuarial RAI. Originally developed as an aid to corrections
departments making decisions about placing, managing, and treating
offenders, it has also been used to make sentencing, parole, and
pretrial release decisions. 157 The COMPAS is much less transparent
than the VRAG or the NVRA. Although the questions canvassed by
the COMPAS (over 120) are available, the weight given to particular
answers to those questions has not been disclosed, nor is it publicly
known whether a given answer is even relevant to the ultimate risk
assessment. The company that developed the COMPAS, Equivant
(formerly Northpointe), has stated that the factors that affect the
tool's Violence Recidivism score consist of the offender's age at the
time of the assessment, the offender's age at the time of first
adjudication, the History of Violence Scale, the History of
Noncompliance Scale, and the Vocational Educational Scale, but it is
not willing to reveal the impact of each factor on the risk score or how
the various scales are constructed. 158 Also, in contrast to the VRAG
and the NVRA, the COMPAS recidivism scores are reported not in
terms of probabilities or prison recommendations but in terms of
"deciles;" inclusion in the first decile does not mean that the offender
poses a 10 percent probability of recidivism, but rather that the
offender fits in the bottom 10 percent of the group on which the
COMPAS was validated. 159 Offenders are designated "low risk" if
they fit within the first through fourth deciles, "medium risk" if
within the fifth through seventh deciles, and "high risk" if within the
eight through tenth deciles. 60
A final RAI that is sometimes used at sentencing, and often used
to help figure out dispositional programs that might reduce risk, is
the HCR-20, version 3 ("HCR-20").161 As the name implies, this RAI
consists of twenty risk factors, ten having to do with historical
matters, five relating to clinical symptoms, and five relating to risk

156. For a PDF of one version of the instrument, see Northpointe, Inc., Risk
Assessment, COMPAS CORE, www.documentcloud.org/documents/2702103Sample-Risk-Assessment-COMPAS-CORE.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
157. See JENNIFER L. SKEEM ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE ON THE QUALITY
OF THE CORRECTIONAL OFFENDER MANAGEMENT

PROFILING FOR ALTERNATIVE

SANCTIONS (COMPAS) 4 (2007).
158.

See NORTHPOINTE, INC., PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO COMPAS 25 (2012),

http://www.northpointeinc. com/files/technicaldocuments/FieldGuide2_081412.
pdf.
159. Id. at 9.
160. Id. at 11.
161. For a description of this instrument, see Kevin S. Douglas & Christopher
D. Webster, The HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme: Concurrent Validity
in a Sample of IncarceratedOffenders, 26 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 3, 8 (1999).
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management or treatment. 162 The historical factors are previous
violence, age at first violent incident, relationship instability,
employment problems, substance use problems, major mental illness,
psychopathy, early maladjustment, personality disorder, and prior
supervision failure.163 The clinical factors are all "dynamic" or
changeable: lack of insight, negative attitudes, active symptoms of
major mental illness, impulsivity, and unresponsiveness to
treatment. 164 The risk management factors are also dynamic:
unfeasibility of plans, exposure to destabilizers, lack of personal
support, noncompliance with remediation attempts, and stress. 165
Each of the twenty factors is scored on a scale of zero to two, so that
the maximum total score is forty.166 However, the developers of the
HCR-20 strongly counsel that a strictly mathematical assessment
should be avoided and that, instead, individuals should simply be
characterized by the evaluator as "high," "medium," or "low" risk. 167
Thus, the HCR-20 is generally considered an SPJ tool, as
distinguished from instruments like the VRAG, NVRA, and
COMPAS, which are actuarial. 168
All of these instruments except the HCR-20 rely on regression
models, a relatively simple form of machine learning that involves
humans inputting data and then relies on computers to calculate
which variables correlate most strongly with the outcome variable of
interest. 169 Developers of these instruments must make several
decisions during the RAI construction process. They must decide
where to get their data (e.g., government records, self-reports), what
data to obtain with respect to reoffending (arrest, convictions,
probation revocations, institutional incidents), what counts as a risk
or protective factor, and the weight that the risk and protective
factors will be assigned in the algorithm. 170
More sophisticated versions of RAIs involve computers setting
their own rules about how much weight to assign variables, based on
large amounts of "training" data. 171 The inner workings of this type
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Kevin S. Douglas et al., HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme:
Overview and Annotated Bibliography, SIMON FRASER UNIv. 3, 27 (2005)
https://escholarship.umassmed. edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1362&context=p
sych-cmhsr.
168. See id.; Douglas &Webster, supranote 161, at 9.
169. See Kern & Farrar-Owens, supra note 153, at 176-78.
170. Jessica M. Eaglin, ConstructingRecidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 6786 (2017).
171. For a description of machine learning and risk assessment, see Richard
Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine Learning Forecastsof Risk to Inform Sentencing
Decisions, 27 FED. SENT'G REP. 222 (2015).
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of machine-learning RAI are much less transparent to human
observers than the RAIs described above. While such RAIs are not
currently widely used in the criminal justice system, 172 they may
become more available in the near future.
B.

Ensuring the Materiality, or Fit, of RAls

One of the reasons the developers of SPJ instruments like the
HCR-20 avoid a more quantitative approach is the belief that
associating probabilities with an individual offender-as might occur
with tools like the VRAG and the NVRA-misrepresents the risk
assessment enterprise to the extent it suggests that research about
groups can predict whether a given individual will reoffend. The
point was put most strongly by Stephen Hart, a developer of another
SPJ instrument, who stated that "[i]t is impossible to directly
measure (using some technology) or calculate (using some natural
law) the specific probability or absolute likelihood that a particular
offender will commit . . . violence, and even impossible to estimate
this risk with any reasonable degree of scientific or professional
certainty."173 David Cooke and Christine Michie have chimed in,
stating-and
purporting
to
demonstrate
statistically-that
"predictions of future offending cannot be achieved in the individual
case with any degree of confidence."1 74 If that is true, the numerical
conclusions reached by the VRAG and the other actuarial
instruments described above are meaningless. Rather, all that can
be said is that, given a person's constellation of risk and protective
factors, they are more or less likely to offend if certain interventions
do not take place.
The view that nomothetic (group-based) information is irrelevant
to a decision about an individual is not new with Hart, Cooke, and
Michie. In 1942, Gordon Allport, a psychologist, said that:
A fatal nonsequitur occurs in the reasoning that if 8 0% of the
delinquents who come from broken homes are recidivists, then
this delinquent from a broken home has an 8 0% chance of
becoming a recidivist. The truth of the matter is that this

172.

TURGUT OZKAN, PREDICTING RECIDIVISM THROUGH MACHINE LEARNING 16

(2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Dallas)
("[C]riminology as a field is lagging behind other branches of science when it
comes to incorporating novel algorithmic decision-making tools.").
173. Stephen Hart, Evidence-Based Assessment of Risk for Sexual Violence, 1
CHAPMAN J. CRIM. JUST. 143, 164 (2009).
174. See David J. Cooke & Christine Michie, Limitations of Diagnostic
Precisionand Predictive Utility in the Individual Case: A Challengefor Forensic
Practice, 34 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 259, 259 (2010).
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delinquent has either 100% certainty of becoming a repeater or
100% certainty of going straight. 175
In 1994, Justice Coyne of the Minnesota Supreme Court wrote: "Not
only are . . . statistics concerning the violent behavior of others
irrelevant, but it seems to me wrong to confine any person on the basis
not of that person's own prior conduct but on the basis of statistical
evidence regarding the behavior of other people."1 76 Consistent with
these views, some courts have excluded "statistical speculation" about
risk on the ground that it is not "individualized" or "particularized." 177
David Faigman, John Monahan, and I have called the issue
raised by these types of comments the "G2i" problem, the translation
of general information to individual cases. 17 8 While we agree that the
law has paid insufficient attention to the difficulties inherent in this
translation process, we disagree with the notion that it is not possible.
Cooke and Michie's statistical argument that confidence intervals
about recidivism probabilities are nonsensical has been roundly
debunked by noted statisticians Peter Imrey and Philip Dawid, who
found their position "seriously mistaken in many particulars" and
concluded that their analysis should "play no role in reasoned
discussions about violence recidivism risk assessment." 179 As Karl
Hanson and Philip Howard have noted, the declarations by Cooke,
Michie, and Hart, "if true[,] . . would be a serious challenge to the
applicability of any empirically based risk procedure to any individual
for anything." 180
I would go further. If these assertions against nomothetic risk
assessment are true, any type of expert testimony-empirically based
or not-would be suspect. Even the expert who purports to bottom
his or her conclusions solely on an interview with the individual in
question relies-consciously or not-on stereotypes, past experiences
with "similar" individuals, and lessons learned from literature about
related groups. In the specific context of risk assessments, factors
175. GORDON W. ALLPORT, SOC. SCI. RSCH. COUNCIL. THE USE OF PERSONAL
DOCUMENTS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 156 (1942).

176. In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Minn. 1994) (Coyne, J., dissenting).
177. See Porter v. Commonwealth, 661 S.E.2d 415, 440 (Va. 2008) (excluding
defense testimony on this ground); see also United States v. Taylor, 583 F. Supp.
2d 923, 942 (E.D. Tenn. 2008) (excluding defense testimony that "invites the jury
to make decisions based upon group characteristics and assumptions"); Rhodes
v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1193, 1194-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that using an
LSI-R score as an aggravating factor at sentencing was impermissible).
178. See David Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin, Group to
Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REv. 417,
417-18 (2014).
179. Peter B. Imrey & A. Philip Dawid, A Commentary on Statistical
Assessment of Violence Recidivism Risk, 2 STAT. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 1 (2015).
180. R. Karl Hanson & Philip D. Howard, Individual Confidence Intervals Do
Not Inform Decision-MakersAbout the Accuracy of Risk Assessment Evaluations,
34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 275, 277 (2010).
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such as age, gender, criminal history, and personality traits influence
(or do not influence) the evaluator's conclusions because they are
"known" or intuited to have particular correlations with, or effects on,
behavior. Barbara Underwood put it well in 1979:
Although the clinician need not identify in advance the
characteristics he will regard as salient, he must nevertheless
evaluate the applicant on the basis of a finite number of salient
characteristics, and thus, like the statistical decisionmaker, he
treats the application as a member of a class defined by those

characteristics.

181

This does not mean that a risk assessment based on an RAI
should be blas6 about the G2i issue. A risk estimate from an RAI
(indeed, any conclusion about risk) should not purport to say that a
particular offender has X probability of reoffending. Nor should it
state that the person will, or will not, reoffend-a fact that, in almost
all cases, is unknowable. Rather, an evaluator using an RAI to
estimate the risk an offender poses should report that the offender
received a risk score that is consistent with the scores of a group, X
percent of which offended in the past. So phrased, a conclusion about
risk offered in a legal proceeding is not "irrelevant" on G2i grounds. 182
However, such a conclusion could still be irrelevant on a number
of other grounds. It is a constitutional axiom that the elements of
crime be clearly delineated, in part to provide sufficient notice to the
public about prohibited conduct, but primarily to control the
discretion of police, prosecutors, and judges, who otherwise might
abuse vague laws. 183 Because risk assessments can have the same
impact on liberty as a conviction for crime, legislatures and courts
should similarly be obligated to set forth, as a matter of law, the
elements of risk that must be proven. As I have argued in other
work, 184 those elements are: (1) the probability, preferably quantified
181. Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior
with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1427
(1979).
182. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Lost in Translation: Statistical Inference in
Court, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1092 (2014) (calling this type of formulation a
"solution to the G2i problem in the courts ....
[T]he instrument does not
say . . . that the tested individual is 26% likely to recidivate. He is merely part
of a group with an average recidivism rate of 26%. Some will recidivate more,
some less. The inference about the tested individual's likelihood of recidivism is
left to the factfinder.").
183. See generally John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189 (1985) (discussing the issues
inherent in vague laws).
184. See Christopher Slobogin, Assessing the Risk of Offending Through
Algorithms, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ALGORITHMS 432, 434

(Woodrow Barfield ed., 2020); Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk
Assessment: Sentencing and Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 583, 587-89 (2018).
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in terms of a group; (2) of a particular outcome; (3) within a particular
time frame; (4) in the absence of a given intervention (usually
incarceration). Every RAI should address these points for the legal
setting in question.
C.

Ensuring the Validity of RAIs

Assume that an RAI produces data that meets all of the fit
requirements. It provides group probability estimates regarding
outcomes, time frames, and interventions that fit the inquiries the
law asks. Decision-makers still should not rely on these results
unless they are reasonably accurate. What lawyers call accuracy or
reliability, social scientists call validity. 18 5 There are numerous
measures of validity. As applied to RAIs, they are all aimed at
determining the extent to which an instrument does what it purports
to do.186
As a matter of legal precedent, the validity inquiry is most
sensibly framed under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the
analogous rules in virtually every state, which require experts to use
"reliable principles and methods" that are "reliably applied."187 This
language was meant to operationalize the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Daubert r. Merrell Dow Pharmacies,188 which tells courts
to ensure that the basis of expert testimony has been subjected to
some type of verification process, such as empirical testing, the
generation of error rates, and peer review through publication in
accepted journals. 189 Many jurisdictions hold that Rule 702 and the
Daubert criteria do not apply in the postconviction setting at issue
here, because they were devised as rules of evidence meant to apply
at trials. 190 But that stance is hard to fathom; if the Daubert test
must be met before evidence can be presented in a tort suit (the
context of the Daubert case), it should certainly apply where weeks,
months, or years of jail or prison time are at stake.
If Daubert, or something like it, did apply to RAIs, it would
require: (1) that the probabilities the instrument generates be stated
with an acceptable level of confidence (calibration validity), (2) that
the RAI do a passable job at distinguishing high risk from low risk

185. Reliability and Validity, WAC

CLEARINGHOUSE,

https://wac.colostate.edu

/resources/writing/guides/reliability-validity/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
186. Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and Policing, supra
note 184, at 588-89.

187.

FED.

R. EVID. 702(c)-(d).

188. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
189. Id. at 589-94.
190. United States v. Slager, 912 F.3d 224, 235 n.4 (4th Cir. 2019) ("Applying
Daubert would run contrary to the sentencing court's 'wide discretion' to
determine the 'sources and types of evidence,' which are relevant for defendants'
individualized sentencing."); United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 342 (5th Cir.
2007) ("No Circuit that we are aware of has applied Daubert to sentencing.").
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individuals (discriminant validity), (3) that the RAI be validated on a
population similar to the population in question (external validity),
(4) that it have satisfactory interrater consistency (implementation
validity, or reliability), and (5) that information about all of these
factors be periodically updated (current validity). 19 1 Notice that, as
expressed here, all of these criteria leave considerable wiggle room
("acceptable level of confidence," "passable job at distinguishing risk,"
"similar populations," "satisfactory reliability," and "periodically
update"). No instrument can achieve perfect predictive validity (an
umbrella term for all five types of validity), and the extent to which
an instrument should approximate that goal may, again, vary with
the legal setting.
The argument could be made that, even if an RAI is adequately
valid in all of these respects, it is not needed to reach accurate results.
Rule 702 holds that expert testimony is admissible only if it is based
on "specialized knowledge" that is "helpful" to the trier of fact.1 92 If
laypeople unaided by experts are just as good at prediction as RAIs,
then Rule 702 counsels against permitting the results of RAIs to be
considered. And the same outcome might be appropriate if experts
using clinical skills unaided by RAIs could do as well or better.
One might think that the statistical expertise needed to put
together an actuarial RAI or the familiarity with research literature
that goes into the creation of SPJ instruments would be sufficient
evidence of specialized knowledge. But if judges or lay-parole boards
are just as able to figure out who will reoffend as evaluators using
RAIs, then arguably that specialized knowledge is not helpful to the
factfinder. One study purported to find just that. In 2018, Julia
Dressel and Hany Farid conducted a study that led them to conclude
that the COMPAS "is no more accurate or fair than predictions made
by people with little or no criminal justice expertise . . . 193
Specifically, they found, based on a comparison of human predictions
and COMPAS predictions for one thousand defendants, that humans
were correct in about 62 percent of the cases and the COMPAS was
correct in 65 percent of the cases. 194
Dressel and Farid's study had one significant problem, however.
Given the way it was conducted, the humans essentially functioned
like algorithms-they were each shown fifty mini-vignettes that
listed only a few features of the defendant, all of which have a robust
statistical relationship with reoffending.195
Further, after the
."

191. For a description of these measures of predictive validity, see Jay P.
Singh, Predictive Validity PerformanceIndicators in Violent Risk Assessment, 31
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 8, 17-18 (2013).
192. FED. R. EVID. 702(a).
193. Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of
PredictingRecidivism, 4 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 3 (2018).
194. Id. at 2.
195. Id. at 1-2.
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subjects registered their opinion about whether the person in the
vignette would recidivate, they were immediately told whether they
were right or wrong, feedback that a judge or parole board virtually
never receives but which, in the study, "trained" the participants
about the most pertinent traits and how they are related to
recidivism. 196 As Sharad Goel and his colleagues concluded, "these
boosted 'human predictions' are far removed from unaided human
judgment. . . ." 197 A follow-up study by Zhiyan Lin and others found
that when lay participants are not provided feedback, they do much
more poorly than an RAI, even when they are given base rate
information about the average rate of offending of the population in
question. 198 The authors also found that when the information given
the humans was "noisier" (that is, when a much richer set of facts was
provided than the barebones list of traits Dressel and Farid used), the
humans did barely better than chance, whereas the statistical model
the authors created was much better at distinguishing recidivists and
non-recidivists. 199
These types of results replicate a large number of other studies
finding that algorithms typically outperform human predictions,
whether made by laypeople or trained clinicians. 20 0 For instance, a
2006 meta-analysis of forty-one studies found that actuarial
techniques routinely did better than clinical methods in every area
investigated, and that with respect to predicting violent or criminal
196.

Zhiyuan "Jerry" Lin et al., The Limits of Human Predictions of
ADVANCES 1, 1 (2020).
197. Sharad Goel, Ravi Shroff, Jennifer Skeem & Christopher Slobogin, The
Accuracy, Equity, and Jurisprudence of Criminal Risk Assessment 5 (Dec. 26,
2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3306723#.
198. Lin et al., supra note 196, at 2-4.
199. Id. at 5 ("[W]e also found that algorithms tended to outperform humans
in settings where decision-makers have access to extensive information and do
not receive immediate feedback and base rates are far from balanced, features of
many real-world scenarios.").
200. See Sarah J. Desmarais et al., Performance of Recidivism Risk
Assessment Instruments in U.S. CorrectionalSettings, 13 PSYCH. SERVS. 206, 206
(2016) ("There is overwhelming evidence that risk assessments completed using
structured approaches produce estimates that are more reliable and more
accurate than unstructured risk assessments."); William M. Grove et al., Clinical
Versus Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-Analysis, 12 PSYCH. ASSESSMENT 19, 19
(2000) (finding that actuarial predictions are about 10 percent more accurate
than clinical predictions); R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, The
Accuracy of Recidivism Risk Assessments for Sexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis
of 118 PredictionStudies, 21 PSYCH. ASSESSMENT 1, 6 (2009) ("For the prediction
of sexual or violent recidivism, the actuarial measures designed for violent
recidivism . . . were superior to any of the other methods."); see also Green
Chen, supra note 38, at 90 (presenting the results of an experimental study in
which human subjects "underperformed the risk assessment even when
presented with its predictions .... ").
&

Recidivism, 6 SC.
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behavior in particular, the actuarial approach was "clearly superior
to the clinical approach." 201 The study also found that even subsets
of "best professionals" designated as experts did not outperform
statistical formulae. 20 2 Several studies that compare algorithms to
judges, clinicians, and correctional officers obtain similar results,
probably because, despite their official position, the decisions of these
people are like those of other people-largely intuitive, heuristicbased, subject to bias, and inattentive to base rates.20 3

&

201. Stefania IEgisd6ttir et al., The Meta-Analysis of Clinical Judgment
Project: Fifty-Six Years of Accumulated Research on Clinical Versus Statistical
Prediction, 34 COUNSELING PSYCH. 341, 368 (2006) ("Out of 1,000 predictions of
violence, the statistical method should correctly identify [ninety] more violent
clients than will the clinical method.").
202. Id. ("We found that when clinicians were given the same or more
information than the statistical formula, the formula did better.").
203. See Thomas H. Cohen et al., Examining Overrides of Risk Classifications
for Offenders on Federal Supervision, 80 FED. PROB. 12, 20-21 (2016) (finding
that overrides by probation officers were "almost all . . an upward adjustment"
and that these overrides "demonstrated a weaker correlation between the
adjusted risk levels and recidivism compared to the original risk levels"); Hanson
& Morton-Bourgon, supra note 200, at 7 (finding that risk ratings that
incorporated the professional judgments of probation officers, psychologists, and
correctional staff "showed lower predictive accuracy than did the unadjusted
actuarial scores"); Kleinberg et al., supranote 38, at 240-41 (finding that the use
of algorithms in pretrial detention determinations would reduce crime rates by
assisting human decision-makers); J. Stephen Wormith et al., The Predictive
Validity of a General Risk/Needs Assessment Inventory on Sexual Offender
Recidivism and an Exploration of the Professional Override, 39 CRIM. JUST.
BEHAV. 1511, 1534 (2012) (finding that a professional override by probation
officers, psychologists, or social workers on the result suggested by an RAI
designed to test sexual offense recidivism "led to a slight, but systematic,
deterioration in the predictive validity .... "); Jongbin Jung et al., Simple Rules
for Complex Decisions 4 (Stan. Univ., Working Paper No. 1702.04690, 2017),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.04690.pdf (finding that when compared to judges in a
pretrial setting a simple algorithm that only looked at two factors of arrestees,
age and previous failures to appear, "consistently outperform[ed] the human
decision-makers"); Kathleen Spencer Gore, Adjusted ActuarialAssessment of Sex
Offenders: The Impact of Clinical Overrides on Predictive Accuracy Gain 63-64
(2007) (Ph.D. dissertation, Iowa State University) (on file with Iowa State
University Digital Repository), https://lb.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?artic
le=16536&context=rtd (finding that psychologist overrides on the results
produced by an instrument designed to predict recidivism for sex offenders "failed
to even nominally exceed the [instrument] in terms of overall predictive
accuracy"); see also Stephen D. Gottfredson & Laura J. Moriarty, ClinicalVersus
Actuarial Judgments in Criminal Justice Decisions: Should One Replace the
Other?, 70 FED. PROB. 15, 15, 17 (2006) (stating that over-reliance on human
judgment may undermine the accuracy of risk assessment because probation and
parole officers may "concentrate on information that is demonstrably not
predictive of offender behavioral outcomes .... ").

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

138
D.

[Vol. 56

The Need for a Presumptionin Favor of RAI Results

Given their superiority to lay judgment, the results of an RAI
that meets the fit and validity requirements discussed above should
be given presumptive effect. Unfortunately, that rarely occurs in
those jurisdictions that use RAIs. As one judge remarked about RAIs,
"[i]t's important to understand that it's just a tool and that judges are
the definitive answer." 20 4 The judicial decisions that have analyzed
the use of RAIs at sentencing have likewise emphasized that the
results of an RAI are but one factor to consider and should not be
dispositive. 20 5
Judges and parole boards are clearly the ultimate decisionmakers about offender risk. But they should be aware that evaluator,
judicial, and parole board adjustments to an RAI usually do not
improve on the actuarial assessment. In fact, consistent with the
studies comparing actuarial and clinical judgment, several studies
find that professional "overrides" of an RAI's risk estimate, whether
by judges, probation officers, or other correctional professionals,
decrease accuracy in predicting offending. 20 6 For example, based on a
sample of 3,646 offenders, Jean-Pierre Guay and Genevieve Parent
found that adjustments to an RAI result made by probation officers
were significantly less accurate than the unadjusted RAI.207 A study
by Schmidt and others found that professional overrides decreased
predictive validity and usually increased risk level. 20 8 The most
recent study likewise found that overrides typically result in an
"upward reshuffling" of risk and a loss of predictive accuracy. 20 9 The
pretrial setting is no different. One study found that judges agreed
with 84 percent of the RAI's "detain" recommendations but only 47
percent of its "release" recommendations. 2 10

204. Matthew DeMichele et al., The Intuitive Override Model: Nudging
Judges Toward PretrialRisk Assessment Instruments 18 (2018) (draft report),
https://craftmediabucket. s3. amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/5-IntuitiveOverride-Model.pdf.
205. See, e.g., Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 573 (Ind. 2010); State v.
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 769 (Wis. 2016).
206. See sources cited supranote 203.
207. Jean-Pierre Guay & Genevieve Parent, Broken Legs, ClinicalOverrides,
and Recidivism Risk: An Analysis of Decisions to Adjust Risk Levels With the
LS/CMI, 45 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 82, 97 (2018).
208. Fred Schmidt et al., Predictive Validity of the Youth Level of Service/Case
ManagementInventory with Youth Who Have Committed Sexual and Non-Sexual
Offenses: The Utility of Professional Override, 43 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 413, 413
(2016).
209. Thomas H. Cohen et al., Risk Assessment Overrides: Shuffling the Risk
Deck Without Any Improvements in Prediction, 47 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1609,
1624 (2020).
210. HUM. RTS. WATCH, "NOT IN IT FOR JUSTICE:" How CALIFORNIA'S PRETRIAL
DETENTION

AND BAIL SYSTEM UNFAIRLY PUNISHES

POOR PEOPLE

92 (2017),
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There are likely several explanations for these types of findings.
Adjustments to RAI results may be based on unverified speculation
about the traits that might affect risk, a belief that "special
circumstances" (e.g., contriteness or surliness) warrant ignoring the
risk score, or simple mistrust of quantified decision-making. 211 Or
they may stem from extraneous considerations.
In particular,
decision-makers know that a false negative decision, which results in
release, is much more likely to be discovered than a false positive
decision that results in incarceration; moreover, of course, these types
of errors are much more likely to have professional and societal
consequences. 2 12 Evaluators, judges, and parole board members
might also dislike the idea of surrendering a significant amount of
their discretion to a table; as one Virginia judge put it, "I don't do
voodoo." 21 3
Nonetheless, if the Rule 702/Daubert reliability standard is
taken seriously, case-by-case modifications should be rare, based on
unique circumstances or obvious anomalies (such as when a person
designated as high risk for violence has since become disabled, 214 or
when a person considered low risk voices a genuine threat of harm). 2 15
Some courts appear to recognize that fact. 2 1 6 It is important to

https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/04/ 11/not-it-justice/how-californias-pretrialdetention-and-bail-system-unfairly.
211. R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk Assessment,
4 PSYCH., PUB. POL'Y & L. 50, 65 (1998) (recommending that clinicians be
"exceedingly cautious" in making adjustments, but noting that "[t]hose skeptical
of actuarial predictions will always find reasons to adjust actuarial estimates").
212. Katherine E. McCallum et al., The Influence of Risk Assessment
Instrument Scores on Evaluators' Risk Opinions and Sexual Offender
Containment Recommendations, 44 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1213, 1214 (2017).
213. Anne Metz et al., Valid or Voodoo: A Qualitative Study of Attorney
Attitudes Towards Risk Assessment in Sentencing and Plea Bargaining 16
(Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2020-25, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3552018.
214. See Daniel A. Krauss & Nicholas Scurich, Risk Assessment in the Law:
Legal Admissibility, Scientific Validity, and Some Disparitiesbetween Research
and Practice, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215, 221 (2013) (noting that an actuarial
algorithm cannot incorporate unique risk factors, such as "if the offender incurred
a physically incapacitating injury").
215. Cf Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 355 (1997) (noting that Hendricks
stated that "the only sure way he could keep from sexually abusing children in
the future was 'to die').
216. Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 573 (Ind. 2010) ("Having been
determined to be statistically valid, reliable, and effective in forecasting
recidivism, the assessment tool scores may, and if possible should, be considered
to supplement and enhance a judge's evaluation, weighing, and application of the
other sentencing evidence in the formulation of an individualized sentencing
program appropriate for each defendant."); State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 758
(Wis. 2016) (contrasting "evidence-based sentencing" with "ad hoc decision
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remember that carefully constructed RAIs are the products of
considering and discarding scores of variables during development.
The authors of the VRAG, for instance, analyzed approximately fifty
possible risk and protective factors before paring them down to
twelve. 21 7 Some of these variables were rejected for practical reasons
(e.g., the difficulty of finding the relevant data) rather than empirical
ones (e.g., no correlation with risk). 2 18 Adjustments based on the
former variables should be fair game for litigants. But relying on a
variable that was found to have no predictive value to change a
person's risk score does not make empirical sense.
Of particular concern is the common finding that upward
adjustments are more likely than downward adjustments and that
these adjustments increase inaccuracy. 2 19 One of the common
mistakes in this regard is to "double-count" criminal history. For
instance, an RAI might indicate that an offender belongs in a low-risk
category, but a judge, noting that the offender has committed two
prior offenses, may decide otherwise; research in Virginia confirms
that this is a common occurrence. 220 Yet, since every RAI already
incorporates criminal history, this assessment will almost certainly
be erroneous.
IV. A DEFENSE

OF RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS AGAINST
INJUSTICE CLAIMS

If they have sufficient fit and meet basic indicia of validity, RAIs,
applied presumptively, can be very helpful to the legal system,
especially if decarceration is a goal. But even if those conditions are
met, RAIs have at least three more hurdles to clear. While critics of
risk algorithms in the criminal justice system have often complained
about "off-label" uses of RAIs (the fit problem) or the difficulty of
getting risk right (the validity problem), they have aimed their
making" and stating that "Wisconsin's commitment to evidence-based practices
has been well documented").
217. Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, Violence Risk Appraisal Guide
(VRAG), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 847, 847 (Brian L. Cutler ed.,

2008).
218. See Angele Christin et al., Courts and Predictive Algorithms 4 (Oct. 27,
2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/20151027/Courts_and_PredictiveAlgorithms.pdf (noting that "dealing with a small
sample size or a large amount of data" could make the model less accurate).
219. Wormith et al., supranote 203, at 1525.
220. Anne Metz et al., Risk and Resources: A Qualitative Perspectiveon LowLevel Sentencing in Virginia, J. CMTY. PSYCHOL. 1476, 1483 (2019) (finding that
83 percent of judges "consider[ed] the results of the NVRA as a 'validating data
point' but not . .. 'dispositive,"' because they also consider "the facts of the case,
and the defendant's criminal history"); see also Green & Chen, supra note 38, at
3 (finding that "participants responding to particularly salient features that are
unevenly distributed by race (such as number of prior convictions)-essentially
double-count[ed] features for which the risk assessment had already accounted").
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heaviest artillery at what they perceive to be the unfairness of using
actuarial tools to determine risk. 221 Even if RAIs were to satisfy the
most stringent fit and validity requirements, critics argue, their use
should be avoided or minimized because they exacerbate racial and
other biases, justify liberty deprivations using factors that are
irrelevant to blameworthiness, and allow incarceration to be based on
dehumanizing, nonindividualized determinations. 222 In the following
discussion, these claims are labeled the egalitarian injustice,
retributive injustice, and procedural injustice critiques.
These critiques
have important
implications
for the
jurisprudence of risk. But none of them should sound the death knell
for RAIs. Each can be countered through careful construction and use
of risk assessment tools and transparency about their inner workings.
A.

The Claim of EgalitarianInjustice

As a matter of formal legal doctrine, the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is the focal point of discussion about
the extent to which the government must treat its citizens equitably.
Generally, the Clause has been construed to permit government
statutes and practices that discriminate between similarly situated
individuals as long as they are based on some rational reason, which
need not be empirically supported but rather can rest simply on
"common sense." 223 However, certain legal classifications-most
prominently race and sex, but also including alienage and religionare "suspect" because of their historical association with political and
social oppression. Thus, a statute or practice that discriminates on
those grounds is subject to "strict scrutiny" (in the case of race) or
"intermediate scrutiny" (in the case of sex). 224 The state may
discriminate on the basis of race only if it can demonstrate that it has
a compelling reason for doing so, using a means narrowly tailored to
meet its objective, and discrimination on the basis of gender is
permitted only upon a similar showing, albeit not quite as

demanding.225
This interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause is usually
called "anticlassification," because it severely limits the government's
ability to discriminate or classify on the basis of a person's race and
sex, regardless of which race or gender is at issue. It is often
distinguished from the "antisubordination" approach to equal
protection,
which focuses on whether the government is
221. See infra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
222. See Green & Chen, supra note 38, at 1, 11, 16.
223. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (noting under
rational basis review, a law "must be upheld against equal protection challenge
if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification" made by the law).
224. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
225. Id.
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discriminating against a group that has historically been oppressed
or subordinated to more privileged groups; under this approach, and
in contrast to the anticlassification principle, race and sex may be
taken into account to the extent that doing so will rectify wrongs
against people of color and women. 226
Brown v. Board of
Education,227 which famously found "separate but equal" white and
black schools to be a violation of equal protection, could be seen as an
illustration of either the anticlassification or the antisubordination
principle; under the educational system declared unconstitutional in
the case, schools were classified on the basis of race, and that
classification significantly disadvantaged a race that had been
enslaved and then subject to Jim Crow laws. 228 When the Court has
been confronted with cases that required a choice between these two
equal protection theories, however, it has usually chosen the
For instance, affirmative action
anticlassification approach. 229
programs for black students could be seen as an implementation of
the antisubordination version of equal protection, but the Court over
time has held that, under most circumstances, they are
unconstitutional because they classify on the basis of race. The
Court's current position is summed up in Chief Justice Roberts'
statement that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race
is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." 230
When a statute or practice does not explicitly differentiate on the
basis of race or sex, but rather simply has a disparate racial or sexbased impact, it is usually not considered violative of equal protection

226. On the distinctions between anticlassification and antisubordination
approaches see Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights
Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIA. L. REV. 9, 9-10
(2003).
227. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
228. See id.; Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L.
REv. 1470, 1484-99 (2004) (noting that, immediately after Brown, some scholars
interpreted it consistently with the anticlassification theory and others with
antisubordination theory).
229. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The ConstitutionalFuture of Race-Neutral
Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and
Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277, 315 (2009) ("The Court's current
approach to equal protection, which has been labeled an antidiscrimination,
anticlassification, or color-blind approach, emphasizes the impropriety of
government use of racial classifications.").
230. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
748 (2007) (plurality opinion); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329-30
(2003) (stating that enrolling a specified percentage of a particular group merely
because of its race or ethnic origin "would amount to outright racial balancing,
which is patently unconstitutional"). But see Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,
570 U.S. 297, 314-15 (2013) (holding that considering race in a holistic
methodology is permissible but must withstand strict scrutiny).
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unless animus toward the racial or sex-based group is shown. 2 31 As
the Supreme Court put it, "our cases have not embraced the
proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether
it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact." 232 This test
recognizes that the absence of an explicit race or sex classification
usually passes constitutional muster.
Application of these concepts to RAIs is not an easy task, but the
overall conclusion should be that, with a few caveats, such
instruments are not violative of equal protection if they provide
relevant and probative results. A number of courts, including the
Supreme Court, have held that protecting the public from dangerous
individuals is a compelling state interest. 2 33 On that assumption,
traditional anticlassification theory might permit even explicit use of
race in a risk algorithm if it has significant predictive validity and if
alternatives to using it could not achieve the state's aims as
However, race alone is not a particularly strong
effectively.
predictor. 234 In any event, in the 2017 decision of Buck v. Davis, 2 35 a
capital sentencing case, the Supreme Court declared, without even
mentioning any possible state interest that might thereby be
undermined, that "[i]t would be patently unconstitutional for a state

231. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
232. Id.
233. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 744 (1987) (stating that in
the pretrial detention context, the federal government has "compelling interests
in public safety .... "); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (stating the
same and collecting cases standing for the proposition that "[t]he 'legitimate and
compelling state interest' in protecting the community from crime cannot be
doubted" and is "a weighty social objective .... ") (internal citations omitted).
Lower courts have found the prevention of even relatively minor crimes or
speculative risks to be a compelling interest. United States v. Chappell, 691 F.3d
388, 399 (4th Cir. 2012) ("The Virginia statute serves the important-indeed
compelling-interest of promoting public safety by prohibiting an individual from
intentionally impersonating a peace officer for a broad range of improper
aims .... "); Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
("[T]he state has an important government interest in promoting public safety
and preventing crime."); May v. Hunter, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1088 (C.D. Cal.
2006) (stating that "the state has a compelling interest to protect the public from
those prisoners who are not in remission, and that in order to protect the public,
it is necessary to provide those prisoners continuing mental health treatment
until the underlying condition can be kept in remission") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
234. Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Margaret B. Kwoka, Title VI DisparateImpact
Claims Would Not Hurt National Security A Response to Paul Taylor, 46 HARv.
J. ON LEGIS. 503, 524-25 (2009) ("Although there are data showing correlations
between arrest rates and race, and incarceration rates and race," no data
demonstrate "either a general or a circumstantial correlation between race and
crime.") (internal quotation mark omitted).
235. 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017).
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to argue that a defendant is liable to be a future danger because of his
race." 236 Perhaps anticipating that conclusion, no mainstream RAI
incorporates race into its algorithm. 2 37 Nor, with one notable
exception, do RAIs use ethnicity, alienage, or religion, which are also
suspect classes and closely aligned with race in many

circumstance .238
Several RAIs do, however, use gender to help differentiate risk
levels. 239 Not clear, post-Davis, is how the Court would react to that
fact. Absent a Supreme Court case that directly addresses the issue,
under current doctrine sex can only be used as a risk factor if there is
a strong justification for doing so (as one lower court decision,
discussed below, has found). 240
If, instead, an RAI uses neither race nor sex as a risk factor but
still produces results that have a disparate racial or gender impact,
then formal classification is not occurring; in that case, use of the RAI
is permissible if there is any rational basis for doing so, unless a
discriminatory purpose can be shown. While the Supreme Court has
not always required serious animus in its disparate impact
jurisprudence, it has tended to require strong proof of discriminatory
purpose in criminal cases. 2 4 1 In any event, developers of RAIs are not
likely to have harbored or intended to implement animus toward any
given racial group, and in fact probably want to avoid
disproportionate outcomes. 242 Thus, a disparate impact argument
against RAIs is unlikely to prevail.

236.

Id. at 775.

237. CTR. ON RACE, INEQ. & THE LAW, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF L. & AM. C.L. UNION,
WHAT DOES FAIRNESS LOOK LIKE? CONVERSATIONS ON RACE, RISK ASSESSMENT
TOOLS, AND PRETRIAL JUSTICE 12-13 (2018), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/

default/files/Final%20Report--ACLU-NYU%20CRIL%20Convening%20on%20
Race%20Risk%20Assessment%20%20Fairness.pdf (addressing the absence of
race in RAI algorithms).
238. Thomas H. Cohen et al., Revalidating the Federal Pretrial Risk
Assessment (PTRA): A Research Summary, 82 FED. PROP. 23, 23-24 (2018)
(noting that the PTRA includes "citizenship" as a variable).
239. See, e.g., Richard P. Kern & Meredith Farrar-Owens, Sentencing
Guidelines with Integrated Offender Risk Assessment, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 165,
166 (2004) (discussing the use of gender as an RAI factor).
240. See infra Subpart IV.A.2.
241. Michael Coenen, Spillover Across Remedies, 98 MINN. L. REv. 1211,
1229-30 (2014) ("[T]he discriminatory purpose rule applies with equal force in
criminal cases" and noting, for instance, that "notwithstanding powerful"
evidence of discrimination against black defendants in cocaine prosecutions,
"Washington v. Davis and its progeny stood as an impenetrable barrier to equal
protection relief, as black crack-cocaine defendants never managed to gather
enough evidence to satisfy the discriminatory purpose requirement.").
242. Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative
DecisionMaking in the Machine-LearningEra, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1193 (2017).
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A number of writers have nonetheless insisted that RAIs violate
related subconstitutional norms when they have a disparate racial
impact, 243 and some have argued that these norms are also violated
when there is disparate impact on other grounds, such as poverty. 244
Surfacing these concerns and responding to them is an important
aspect of exploring the justness of algorithmic risk assessment. The
overall conclusion reached here is that, given the importance of valid
RAIs to achieving the state's goals of protecting the public and
reducing incarceration, neither formal equal protection doctrine nor
other inequality concerns should derail development of RAIs.
However, the balancing of state and individual interests of the
type that is inherent in equal protection analysis does trigger fairness
concerns. Specifically, it raises questions about whether certain
outcome variables-most predominately, certain types of criminal
history-are out-of-bounds on race discrimination grounds, whether
protected characteristics-particularly sex-can nonetheless be
explicitly considered in developing RAIs, and whether other
characteristics-such as being unemployed-are so weakly predictive
that they cannot survive even the minimal rational basis test.
1.

Race

Probably the best-known critique of RAIs came in a 2016 article
published in ProPublicaabout the COMPAS.245 The article reported
that the instrument was "biased against blacks" because it produced
a false positive rate for that group that was twice the false positive
rate for white people when the cut-off was "medium" risk (45 percent
to 23 percent) and three times the white false positive rate for those
rated "high" risk (16 percent to 5 percent). 246 The developer of the
COMPAS did not disagree with these conclusions but pointed out that
among both black and white people, groups with the same scores
recidivated at the same rates, with, for instance, 21 percent of the
high risk group for black people and 17 percent of the high risk group
for white people reoffending. 247 Further, as other commentators

243. Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MIcH. L. REV. 1023, 1025
(2017) (arguing for "algorithmic affirmative action"); Harcourt, supra note 136,
at 237.
244. See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific
Rationalizationof Discrimination,66 STAN. L. REv. 803, 805-06 (2014).
245. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminalsentencing.
246. Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm,
PROPUBLICA
(May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-weanalyzed-the-compas -recidivism-algorithm.
247. Sam Corbett-Davies et al., What Makes an Algorithm Fair?, MEDIUM
(Oct. 28, 2016), https://medium.com/soal-food/what-makes-an-algorithm-fair6ad64d75dd0c (pointing out that "[d]efendants assigned the highest risk score
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pointed out, the differential false positive rates produced by a
reasonably well-calibrated instrument like the COMPAS are
inevitable as a statistical matter when, as the data from the sample
used by ProPublica seemed to indicate, 248 the black crime rate is
higher than the white crime rate. When black defendants have a
higher rate of reoffending, a well-calibrated algorithm will classify a
greater proportion of black defendants as high risk, and thus a
greater proportion of black defendants who ultimately do not reoffend
will have been classified as high risk. 249
The COMPAS abides by the anticlassification principle; race is
not considered. Nonetheless, it has been lambasted by a number of
commentators. For instance, the RAND Corporation stated:
By accurately reflecting base rate criminality and thereby
treating black people as higher risk than white people,
COMPAS perpetuates a disproportionate impact along racial

lines.... If existing base rates are unjust (because of historical
factors and structural racism), it can be argued that accurate
algorithms, such as COMPAS, are complicit in and contribute
to this society-wide injustice. 25

This language mischaracterizes the interaction of race and risk
on the COMPAS in several ways. First, the algorithm does not
"treat[] black people as higher risk than white people." It treats
people with risk factors X, Y, and Z as higher risk than those who do
not have those risk factors-a greater proportion of whom happen to
be black. Second, its impact is not "disproportionate" to the amount

[on the COMPAS] reoffended at almost four times the rate as those assigned the
lowest score (81 percent versus 22 percent)," and that "among defendants who
scored a seven on the COMPAS scale, 60 percent of white defendants reoffended,
which is nearly identical to the 61 percent of black defendants who reoffended");
Larson et al., supra note 246 ("Black defendants who were classified as a higher
risk of violent recidivism did recidivate at a slightly higher rate than white
defendants (21 percent vs. 17 percent) .... ").
248. Larson et al., supra note 246 ("Across every risk category, black
defendants recidivated at higher rates.").
249. Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 247 ("If the recidivism rate for white
and black defendants is the same within each risk category, and if black
defendants have a higher overall recidivism rate, then a greater share of black
defendants will be classified as high risk. And if a greater share of black
defendants are classified as high risk, then . .. a greater share of black
defendants who do not reoffend will also be classified as high risk."). Note that
the same phenomenon would occur, for instance, with age and sex; because young
people and males commit more crimes, a well-calibrated RAI will produce more
false positives at each score among youth and men than among older people and
women.

250. OSONDE A. OSOBA ET AL., ALGORITHMIC EQUITY: A FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL
APPLICATIONS 20 (2019); see also MICHAEL TONRY, DOING JUSTICE, PREVENTING
CRIME 180-82 (2020).
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of crime black individuals commit; as RAND admits, the COMPAS
accurately reflects base rate criminality. Third, if that base rate
criminality is unjust because of structural racism, risk assessment is
not the central problem; rather the entire criminal justice system,
which assumes people can be punished for their crimes, is "complicit
in and contributes to this society-wide injustice." While there is a
strong basis for calling the black crime base rate "unjust" from a
sociological point of view, that critique, carried to its logical limit,
would end far more than risk assessment; indeed, it is the predicate
for the Abolish Prison movement. 251
ProPublica's less radical solution to the problem-equalizing
false positives rates for both races-has its own difficulties. This
approach, sometimes called classificationparity,2 52 would mean that
more white people would be classified as high risk when in fact they
are not, or that more people of color who are high risk would be
classified as low risk, or both. Additionally, as Richard Berk has
suggested, that route would probably result in more victims of color,
as individuals who should have been detained are released back into
their communities. 253
The approach taken by the COMPAS, which tries to ensure that
people who pose the same degree of risk are in the same risk category,
regardless of race, is a preferable method of ensuring fairness. 2 54
First, it sidesteps possible concerns about violating the Equal
Protection Clause by avoiding intentional misclassification of white
or black people. Second, it avoids the political blowback that is likely
to accompany migrating affirmative action principles to the criminal
context. Third, and most importantly, it treats people of equal risk

251. See PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD 229-30 (2018) ("U.S. prisons are built for
black men, and black men will be free, literally and figuratively, only when
prisons are no more.... Think of abolition as the third gift people who fight for
African American freedom will have provided the country, after they defeated
slavery and Jim Crow.").
252. SAM CORBETT-DAVIES & SHARAD GOEL, THE MEASURE AND MISMEASURE OF
FAIRNESS: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF FAIR MACHINE LEARNING 11 (2018),

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.00023.pdf.
253. Richard Berk, Accuracy and Fairness for Juvenile Justice Risk
Assessments, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 191 (2019) ("When one adjusts
algorithms to make them more fair for black perpetrators, one risks increasing
unfairness for black crime victims.").
254. See Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2272
(2019) ("[A]lgorithmic affirmative action, in essence, constitutes a rejection of
actuarial risk assessment itself."); Gina Vincent & Jodi Viljoen, Racist
Algorithms or Systemic Problems? Risk Assessments and Racial Disparities, 47
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 1576, 1580 (2020) (describing the views of several
empiricists on the issue of racial bias and concluding "by our ethical standards,
there is currently no valid evidence that instruments in general are biased
against individuals of color. Where bias has been found, it appears to have more
to do with the specific risk instrument.").
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equally. Each risk classification represents the same risk, regardless
of race. Propublica'santisubordinationist approach clearly violates
not just anticlassification principles but also calibration (accuracy)
mandates.
At the same time, caution is necessary in evaluating the racial
impact of RAIs. For instance, it is well-documented that people of
color are more likely to be arrested for drug-possession crime than
white people who engage in the same behavior, in part because of
biased policing practices and in part because such crimes, when
committed by poorer individuals, are more likely to be publicly
observable. 255
The same is probably also true of most
misdemeanors. 256 If an RAI uses arrests for these types of crimes as
an outcome variable, as the COMPAS appears to do, it will be
predicting that people of color commit more of these crimes than white
people, when in fact they do not. 257 Sandra Mayson makes the point
with an anecdote: in New Orleans, where she practiced law, a black
defendant with three arrests was not much of a concern-but a white
defendant with three arrests was "really bad news!" 258
There are two solutions to this problem. The first is to change
the outcome variable to either convictions rather than arrests (on the
assumption that convictions more accurately indicate criminal
activity between races), or to arrests (or convictions) for violent crimes
only. Changing the variable to violent crimes is preferable, not only
for empirical reasons (arrests and convictions for violent crimes are
less likely to be racially contingent) 259 but because refusing to release
255. See Chelsea Barabas et al., Technical Flaws of PretrialRisk Assessment
Tools Raise Grave Concerns, MIT MEDIA LAB 3 (July 17, 2019), https://damprod.media. mit. edu/x/2019/07/16/TechnicalFlawsOfPretrialML%20site.pdf;
Peter Reuter et al., Assessing the Crack-Down on Marijuana in Maryland 27
(May, 5 2001) (unpublished manuscript), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.608.4702&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
Some studies have
suggested that white people use and sell drugs at even higher rates than black
people. Jonathan Rothwell, How the War on Drugs Damages Black Social
Mobility, BROOKINGS (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/socialmobility-memos/2014/09/30/how-the-war-on-drugs -damages-black-socialmobility/; see also Katherine Beckett al., Race, Drugs, and Policing:
UnderstandingDisparitiesin Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 11718 (2006).
256. Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice,
98 B.U. L. REV. 731, 769-70 (2018).
257. However, it is incorrect to draw the conclusion from this that the
resulting algorithms are "distorted." Cf Barabas et al., supra note 255, at 3-4
(stating that using distorted data produces distorted results).
258. Mayson, supranote 254, at 2264.
259. See Rashida Richardson et al., Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil
Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice,
94 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 15, 16 (2019) (noting that police data may include
arrests of people known to be innocent, false claims of criminal activity, and
doctored arrest statistics).
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people who have served the minimum sentence on the grounds that
they might commit a misdemeanor or low-level felony is not
justifiable as a normative matter, even if the risk of such offending is
high. 26 0 Several recent studies in the pretrial context have found that
RAIs so constructed (by using arrests for serious crimes as the
outcome measure) do not produce racial bias even in the sense
highlighted by the ProPublica study. 26 1
The second solution to the disparate policing problem-in
addition to or instead of changing the outcome measure-is what
could be called race-conscious calibration of the RAI, which in effect
involves creating different algorithms for different ethnicities or
races. In Mayson's New Orleans, a race-conscious RAI might put a
black defendant with three arrests in a much lower risk category than
a white defendant with three arrests. The possible problem with this
approach is
that, like
classification
parity,
it violates
anticlassification principles; it explicitly takes race into account. But
unlike classification parity-which to achieve its version of fairness
changes an accurate conclusion about propensity to commit
crime 2 2-race-conscious
calibration serves the important state
interests of protecting the public and avoiding unnecessary
incarceration by rectifying the impact of discriminatory practices that
unfairly raise one's risk score. The classification parity approach
nullifies a person's real risk level.
In contrast, race-conscious
calibration that corrects for racially biased policing works to nullify a
person's erroneous risk level, one that is a consequence of prior
government malfeasance and that cannot be justified by any
legitimate state interest; thus, it should not be considered a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.263

260. See ASHWORTH & ZEDNER, supra note 51, at 260 (arguing that sentence
enhancements based on risk should not occur unless the person "is adjudged to
present a very serious danger to others" and the person "has a previous conviction
for a very serious offence").
261. Sarah L. Desmarais et al., Predictive Validity of Pretrial Risk
Assessments: A Systematic Review of the Literature, 47 CRIM. JUST. & BEH Av.
ONLINEFIRST, June 2020, at 17-19; Douglas B. Marlowe et al., Employing
Standardized Risk Assessment in Pretrial Release Decisions: Association with
Criminal Justice Outcomes and Racial Equity, 44 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 361, 37172 (2020) (finding no racial disparities in risk prediction but finding such
disparities in length of detention and diversion); see also Evan M. Lowder et al.,
Improving the Accuracy and Fairness of Pretrial Release Decisions: A Multi-site
Study of Risk Assessments Implemented in Four Counties, NA'L INST. OF JUST.,
https://nij.ojp.gov/funding/awards/2018-r2-cx-0023 (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
262. See Angwin et al., supra note 245.
263. See Aziz Z. Huq, Constitutional Rights in the Machine Learning State 31
(U. of Chi. Pub. L. Working Paper, Paper No. 752, 2020) https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3613282 ("[A]n official's mere awareness of race
raises no constitutional problem. By analogy, it may also be that mere inclusion
of race as a feature of training data should not be per se problematic.").
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Note that this entire discussion about inequality and risk factors
is only possible when risk assessment is a product of an RAI. If
instead a risk assessment is the product of human judgment, taking
any type of ameliorative action would be much more difficult. Even
with implicit bias training, humans will find it difficult to avoid the
impact of race or race proxies. 2 64 And even with a requirement that
reasons for acting be documented, human intuitive predictions of
reoffending are opaque, which makes them difficult to challenge. 265
In contrast, an RAI displays its stereotyping assumptions on its face.
Thus, compared to human-driven risk assessment, RAIs allow bias to
be more easily discovered. And because of that transparency, RAIs
can take racial biases into account.
For example, using the Post Conviction Risk Assessment tool (a
federal probation RAI) and large samples, Jennifer Skeem and
Christopher Lowenkamp have shown a number of ways race can be
used in constructing a well-calibrated instrument that reduces
significantly the "proxy effect" of race. 266 Crystal Yang and Will
Dobbie were able to do the same thing in the pretrial setting with the
PSA, with only minimal impact on predictive validity. 267 These sorts
of efforts illustrate that fact, as Sendhil Mullainathan asserted in the
title to a recent article, Biased Algorithms Are Easier to Fix than
Biased People.268
2.

Sex

While race is not explicitly incorporated into any commonly used
RAI, sex-specifically, maleness-is a risk factor in several risk
tools. 2 69 In part, that is because developers have realized that an RAI

264. Adam Benforado, Can Science Save Justice?, 101 JUDICATURE 24, 26, 28
(2017) ("Studies on sentencing have shown that judges are influenced by the race
of the defendant . . . . [T]he latest psychological research suggests that much of
the skew is not susceptible to conscious control. There is no magic switch to erase
a lifetime of exposure to damaging stereotypes that link the concepts of blackness
and violence .... ").
265. See id. at 30.
266. Jennifer Skeem & Christopher Lowenkamp, Using Algorithms to
Address Trade-Offs Inherent in PredictingRecidivism, 38 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 259,
263 (2020).
267. CRYSTAL S. YANG & WILL DOBBIE, EQUAL PROTECTION
ALGORITHMS: A NEW STATISTICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 53-58

UNDER
(2019),

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3462379.
268. Sendhil Mullainathan, BiasedAlgorithms are Easier to Fix Than Biased
People, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/06/
business/algorithm-bias-fix.html; see also Jon Kleinberg et al., Discriminationin
the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 115 (2018) ("Getting the proper
regulatory system in place . . has the potential to turn algorithms into a
powerful counterweight to human discrimination and a positive force for social
good of multiple kinds.").
269. See supra text accompanying notes 150, 154.
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that is well-calibrated for men may not be well-calibrated for women;
women do not recidivate as much as men, apparently even when they
are otherwise associated with identical risk factors. 270 From an
empirical point of view, that situation calls for an RAI validated on a
female population. But, just as with race, while this sex-conscious
classification approach assures better calibration, it may violate the
anticlassification principle. For instance, in Craig v. Boren,271 the
Supreme Court struck down a law that allowed women to buy alcohol
at age eighteen while prohibiting alcohol sales to males until they
were twenty-one, despite evidence that men had higher rates of drunk
driving.272 Apparently relying on similar reasoning, statutes in some
states specifically ban use of gender in imposing a sentence. 273
Nonetheless, in State v. Loomis,274 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
suggested that discriminating on the basis of sex is permissible if it
validly helps distinguish between males and females in terms of
risk. 275 Loomis's sentence had been enhanced using the COMPAS,
which specifically took gender into account; Loomis argued that this
disposition violated due process. 27 6 Although, as a result of this
framing, the Wisconsin court did not explicitly address the equal
protection issue, it did state, in the course of rejecting Loomis's claim,
that "it appears that any risk assessment tool which fails to
differentiate between men and women will misclassify both
genders." 277 In essence, the court was saying that, because of its
enhancement to accuracy, incorporating gender was a narrowly
tailored means of meeting the state's interest in preventing harm to
the public in a cost-efficient manner.
Had the court directly addressed the equal protection issue,
would it have had to decide otherwise? Boren might be distinguished
on the ground that the statistical evidence in that case about the

270. Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a Post-Booker Federal
Guidelines World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 691, 694 (2006).
271. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
272. Id. at 192, 210.
273. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.11(C) ("A court that imposes a sentence
upon an offender for a felony shall not base the sentence upon the race, ethnic
background, gender, or religion of the offender."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-102(4)
("Sentencing should exclude all considerations respecting race, gender, creed,
religion, national origin and social status of the individual").
274. 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
275. See id. at 753-54.
276. Id. at 753.
277. Id. at 766. Other courts have recognized this point. See, e.g., Karsjens
v. Jesson, 6 F. Supp. 3d 958, 967-68 (D. Minn. 2014) (describing expert testimony
in cases challenging female sex offenders' civil commitment programming stating
that actuarial risk tools normed on male sex offenders are inapplicable to
females); In re Risk Level Determination of S.S., 726 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2007) (noting that experts declined to score a sexual recidivism risk tool for
a female defendant as it had not been validated on women).
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difference between men and women was weak; as Justice Brennan
pointed out for the majority, the data showing that men are arrested
for drunk driving more often than women might merely mean that
"'reckless' young men who drink and drive are transformed into arrest
statistics, while their female counterparts are chivalrously escorted
home." 278
But in two cases applying Title VII, the federal
antidiscrimination statute, the Court held that employers may not
require women to pay more into, or receive less from, retirement
accounts than men, despite strong data showing that women live
longer and thus that, without those adjustments, they will cost the
employer more money than men. 279 Although Title VII does not apply
to the criminal justice system and recognizes a broader scope to
discrimination claims, these cases signal the Court's concern with
explicit use of sex as a discriminator.
At the same time, the state's interest in keeping the female
drinking age at eighteen at issue in Boren, and even the employer's
interest in saving money in the Title VII cases, pale in comparison to
the state's twin interests that are inevitably at stake in cases like
Loomis: protecting the public and avoiding unnecessary incarceration
(in this case, of women). If Virginia's NVRA instrument is any guide
(recall that, under that instrument, being male brings ten points,
being female only one), 280 sex is a powerful predictor that can help
Like race-conscious calibration, sexeffectuate both interests.
conscious calibration makes empirical sense and should not be
considered violative of equal protection.
3.

Other Traits

Of the factors typically found in RAIs, only race and sex trigger
Fourteenth Amendment protection and thus require more than a
rational basis for their use under current law. Nonetheless, Sonja
Starr has argued that the Fourteenth Amendment also bars RAIs
from using poverty or proxies for it (e.g., unemployment, location, or
house ownership), 28 1 based primarily on the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Bearden v. Georgia282 that revoking parole for an
offender who has failed to pay a fine "would be little more than
punishing [him] for his poverty" and "would be contrary to the
fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment." 283
However, no court has interpreted Bearden to mean that factors
related to poverty are anathema in assessing either risk or
278. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202 n.14 (1976).
279. Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp.
Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1086 (1983); City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978).
280. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
281. Starr, supranote 244, at 830.
282. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
283. Id. at 671, 673.
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punishment generally. 284 Furthermore, Bearden itself stated that "a
sentencing court can consider a defendant's employment history and
financial resources in setting an initial punishment"285 and
emphasized that the only sentencing practice it was barring was the
use of poverty "as the sole justification for imprisonment," 2 86 which no
RAI comes close to doing.
This does not mean that any wealth-related risk factor is fair
game-the state still must demonstrate a rational basis for its use.
The rationale developed above for permitting reliance on risk factors
like sex or that correlate with race rested on the assumption that
these factors are powerful predictors that help achieve the compelling
state interest of protecting society. 287 Following equal protection's
tiered analysis, the relevance to risk assessment of other factorssuch as age, employment status, home life as a child, diagnosis, or
marital status-need not be as robust. At the same time, however,
these types of factors should add some nontrivial predictive weight to
Because of their minimal predictive value, for
the algorithm.
instance, employment and marital status were eventually dropped
from Virginia's NVRA.288
In contrast, some RAIs explicitly treat these types of factors as
strong predictors of reoffending. For instance, the VRAG includes as
risk factors psychopathy, personality disorder, whether the
individual's parents were present in the home at age sixteen, and
marital status. Furthermore, these factors, especially the first three,
are given significant weight in the algorithm. 289 In contrast to some
types of arrests, these traits cannot easily be attributed to
discrimination, even on the part of society as a whole, much less the
government. If one's intuition remains that it is an injustice to base
confinement on such factors even when they clearly improve
calibration, it probably stems not from concerns about egalitarian
injustice, but rather from worries about what could be called
retributive injustice.

284. See, e.g., United States v. Flowers, 946 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300 (M.D. Ala.
2013) ("[R]elative wealth and poverty will inevitably have some effect on the
administration of justice .... "); State v. Johnson, 315 P.3d 1090, 1099 (Wash.
2014) (interpreting Bearden to mean that a person cannot be imprisoned for
failure to pay a fine).
285. 461 U.S. at 671.
286. Id.
287. Huq, supra note 263, at 4-5.
288. Email from Meredith Farrar-Owens, Dir., Va. Crim. Sent'g Comm'n, to
Christopher Slobogin (March 25, 2020, 9:58 EST) (indicating that these two
factors were dropped on July 1, 2013, "based on a study of new felony cases").
289. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
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The Claim of Retributive Injustice

While good calibration, adapted to ensure that algorithms are not
tainted by state-enabled discrimination, can minimize egalitarian
injustice, it may not assuage those who voice a closely related fairness
objection, to the effect that many risk factors have nothing to do with
individual blameworthiness.
Hollywood's images of futuristic
societies in which prisoners are selected according to genetic makeup
or brain chemistry are far from current reality. But the difference
between bio-prediction of this sort and an actuarial score, which often
relies on static or congenital factors, is one of degree, not kind.
The retributive injustice claim comes in two forms. The strong
form is that risk can never be a legitimate consideration in the
criminal process. That claim will not be addressed here, although I
have addressed it elsewhere. 290 The weaker retributive injustice
claim is that even if risk can in whole or part justify criminal
punishment, this type of deprivation of liberty must be based solely
on culpable conduct. 291 At its broadest reach, that claim would mean
that RAIs cannot rely on conduct that is not criminally
blameworthy-such as substance abuse, remaining single, or
choosing not to work-nor on circumstances that are not
blameworthy in any sense-such as being abandoned by one's parents
before majority or living in a particular area. Even more obvious for
those who take this perspective, RAIs cannot incorporate traits, such
as gender, age, or diagnosis, that have nothing to do with any type of
conduct, blameworthy or not.
Perhaps the RAI that most
dramatically transgresses this point of view is provided by Virginia's
NVRA, which, as mentioned above, recommends a prison sentence
simply for being under twenty-one, being male, and having one prior
conviction. 292

In Buck v. Davis, the Supreme Court appeared to recognize the
retributive injustice concern. As noted earlier, the thrust of Davis
was a rebuke of egalitarian injustice; the Court stated that using the
fact of being black as a risk factor "appealed to a powerful racial
stereotype" and "coincided precisely with a particularly noxious
strain of racial prejudice .... "293 But the Court went on to say that
sentencing a person on the basis of race "is a disturbing departure
from a basic premise of our criminal justice system: Our law punishes

290.

See Christopher Slobogin, A Defence of Modern Risk-Based Sentencing,
SENTENCING: NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 107, 11621 (Jan Willem de Keijser et al., eds., 2019) (Hart Publishing).
291. Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Predictionof Recidivism,
26 FED. SENT'G REP. 167, 169 (2014) ("Ascribed characteristics for which
individuals bear no responsibility, such as race, ethnicity, gender, and age, should
not be included .... ").
292. See Kern & Owens, supra note 153, at 166.
293. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 776 (2017).
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people for what they do, not who they are." 294 Taken literally, this
latter sentiment would prohibit punishers from relying not only on
race but also on risk factors such as gender and age, and probably on
factors involving current mental state, such as diagnosis or lack of
insight, since none of these variables involve conduct.
At the same time, the Supreme Court on several occasions has
explicitly permitted death sentences to be imposed on the ground that
the offender is "dangerous," 2 95 including in Barefoot v. Estelle,296
where the state's expert opinion about dangerousness was predicated
on a diagnosis. 297 Furthermore, the provenance for the Court's
declaration in Davis that people cannot be punished for "who they
are" is not at all clear: while Davis's ban on race presumably comes
from the Equal Protection Clause, the opinion did not identify any
particular constitutional provision when it made its more general
pronouncement about the proper basis of punishment. 298 The most
likely candidate is the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment, which has been construed to forbid criminalizing status,
specifically the status of being addicted. 299 But the people who are
subjected to risk assessment at sentencing have already been
convicted for criminal conduct, defined by statutes that are
presumably constitutional. And the courts, including the Supreme
Court, have long permitted sentences to be based on risk.30 0 So in the
end, the Davis decision is most accurately described as a prohibition
on the use of race in sentencing, rather than as a wholesale rejection
of incarceration based on the status of being high risk.

294. Id. at 778.
295. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275-76 (1976) (stating that "prediction of
future criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered
throughout our criminal justice system [mentioning bail, sentencing, and parole
determinations as examples of such decisions]. . . . The task that a Texas jury
must perform in answering the statutory question [about dangerousness of a
capital defendant] is thus basically no different from the task performed
countless times each day throughout the American system of criminal justice.").
296. 463 U.S. 880, 884 (1983).
297. Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Dr. Grigson] placed Barefoot in
the 'most severe category' of sociopaths (on a scale of one to ten, Barefoot was
'above ten'), and stated that there was no known cure for the condition.").
298. Davis, 137 S. Ct. at 778.
299. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (holding that
criminalizing the status of being a narcotics addict violates the Eighth
Amendment).
300. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987) (allowing pretrial
detention to be based on risk); Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51,
55 (1937) (noting that the government "may inflict a deserved penalty merely to
vindicate the law or to deter or to reform the offender or for all of these
purposes.... [The offender's] past may be taken to indicate his present purposes
and tendencies and significantly to suggest the period of restraint and the kind
of discipline that ought to be imposed upon him.").
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While Davis may not squarely pose a retributive injustice
challenge to RAIs, some scholars have done so, arguing that a
criminal justice system unmoored from just desert is immoral because
of its insult to autonomy and dignity. The point was put succinctly
by Andrew von Hirsch, a noted retributivist, who posited that
"[u]nless the person actually made the wrongful choice he was
predicted to make, he ought not to be condemned for that choice-and
hence should not suffer punishment for it."301 That view might permit
risk-oriented punishment based on prior crimes as well as the current
crime. But, as applied to RAIs, it would prohibit not only risk factors
that do not consist of conduct but also risk factors based on conduct
that is not criminally blameworthy, such as choices about
psychoactive substance use, employment, or education. Accordingly,
it would put an end to modern risk assessment.
From a risk assessment perspective, there are two significant
practical problems with limiting risk factors to criminal conduct:
First, removal of all non-crime factors from an RAI is likely to
substantially reduce accuracy. Second, restricting RAIs to crime-only
risk factors is also likely to create egalitarian injustice. A young male
with psychopathic tendencies and one prior crime represents a much
higher risk than an older female suffering from anxiety who has
committed the same crime; yet, under a crime-only approach, both
would be treated identically in terms of risk.
A true
retributivist worried
about risk's insult to
blameworthiness would not be dissuaded by these types of concerns.
Rather, more conceptual counterarguments are required. A first such
response to the retributive injustice claim is that it is based on a
category mistake.
Interventions based on risk are not about
culpability for past conduct; they are focused on preventing future
conduct. Culpability assessments are the province of trial and, as
discussed in Part II, they should also be crucial in setting the range
of sentencing options. 30 2 But if risk is a legitimate consideration at
the post-trial stage, it is a separate inquiry from blameworthiness and
should not be entangled with it.
The retributive inquiry and the risk inquiry are usually
orthogonal to one another.
While youth is often considered a
mitigating factor from a retributive point of view, it is clearly an
aggravating factor from a risk perspective.30 3 The fact that one was
abandoned by one's parents at age sixteen might be considered a

301. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 11 (1985).

302.

See supra Subpart II.A.

303.

Compare SENTENCING MULTIPLE CRIMES 258 (Jesper Ryberg, Julian V.

Roberts & Jan W. de Keijser, eds., 2017) (considering youth a mitigating factor),
with Elizabeth F. Emens, Aggravating Youth: Roper v. Simmons and Age
Discrimination, 1 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 75-79 (2005) (considering youth an
aggravating factor).
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mitigator when focused on culpability, but to the developers of the
VRAG, it is a risk factor.30 4 Or consider criminal history itself. It
may be an aggravator from both a blameworthiness and a risk
perspective, but rarely in precisely the same way. A third property
crime might be considered highly blameworthy nose-thumbing to a
retributivist, but not particularly indicative of high risk;
alternatively, a retributivist might consider the two previous
convictions irrelevant once the associated sentences have been
served, but if risk assessment is the goal, these crimes presumably
would be highly probative of future conduct.30 5 Risk and culpability
are clearly conceptually separate inquiries.
The first two examples also put the lie to the implicit claim by
those who make the retributive injustice argument that culpability
assessments are never based on status. Youth is a status. Yet, it is
routinely treated as a mitigator by retributivists; 3 6 indeed, in his
latest work, von Hirsch himself has proposed a "youth discount" for
punishment and argued that it should be "categorical," not
individualized, which means that simply being youthful would
require leniency. 30 7 Likewise, parental abandonment is a status. But
a retributivist might treat it as a mitigator.
One cannot avoid this contradiction by claiming that, as long as
noncriminal factors are used only as a mitigator, the damage to
dignity and autonomy is minimized. If people are provided leniency
based in part on their youth, older people are being treated more
harshly because of their status. If people who were left by their
parents are given a break, people with intact families are not. Status
permeates both risk-based and retribution-based regimes.
At the same time, contrary to the literal interpretation of the
Supreme Court's decision in Buck v. Davis, a person's risk
categorization is not simply a status, but rather is closely associated
with blameworthy choices, in two ways. First, risk assessment is, in
large part, an evaluation of what a person has chosen to do. That is
because it is, in essence, an evaluation of one's character, which on
many accounts, including from scholars such as Peter Arenella,

304. Harris et al., supra note 149, at 382, 387.
305. The debate among retributivists as to how to treat punishment for
multiple crimes has produced numerous positions which are not reconcilable with
one another. See generally SENTENCING MULTIPLE CRIMES, supra note 303.
306. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571-73 (2005) (quoting Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)) ("Once the diminished culpability of
juveniles is recognized, it is evident that the penological justifications for the
death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults," and rejecting the
argument that it is "arbitrary and unnecessary to adopt a categorical rule barring
imposition of the death penalty on any offender under 18 years of age").
307.

ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DESERVED CRIMINAL SENTENCES

§

11.2c (2017).
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James Whitman, and Kyron Huigens, is directly relevant to desert.3 08
The Supreme Court itself has made the connection when it stated in
Deck v. Missouri30 9 that "character and propensities of the defendant
are part of a 'unique, individualized judgment regarding the
punishment that a particular person deserves."'3 10 Character is an
amalgam of choices-choices that are often constrained by
circumstances, but choices nonetheless. People make decisions not
only about whether to engage in antisocial conduct but about their
friends, family life, education, work, the places they frequent, the
amount of drugs or alcohol they ingest, and whether to seek
treatment for emotional problems such as anger and impulsivity-all
of which are examples of precisely the types of activities captured in
the most sophisticated RAIs.3 11 If these choices combine to make
one's character high risk, they could be said to be blameworthy, even
if they do not involve criminal activity. 312
Of course, character analysis alone does not justify using risk
factors that have nothing to do with choice, such as age, gender, and
diagnosis.
But the ultimate, and best, argument against the
retributive injustice claim is that viewed properly, risk factorswhether or not they are the product of choice-are not the reason for

&

308. Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral Agency: The Relevance of
Characterto OurMoral Culpability Judgments, 7 SoC. PHIL. & POL'Y 59, 61 (1990)
(arguing that there is no means of judging persons except through assessing their
character); Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM.
MARY L. REV. 943, 1022-34 (2000) (describing the aretaic theory of punishment,
which aims at improving character); James Q. Whitman, The Case for Penal
Modernism: Beyond Utility and Desert, 1:2 CRITICAL ANALYSIS LAW 143, 178
(2014) (arguing for a European style trial mixing assessment of desert and
character, because such a trial "makes it possible to consider the full spectrum of
information about individual blameworthiness, including both dangerousness
and deservingness").
309. 544 U.S. 622 (2005).
310. Id. at 633 (emphasis added) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 900
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)). Making the link between risk and character
even more explicit, just prior to this statement, the Court stated that "danger to
the community . .. almost inevitably affects adversely the jury's perception of the
defendant's character." Id. at 622-23. The Court has even adhered to this
sentiment in cases involving young offenders, whose character is typically in its
formative stages; thus, for instance, while emphasizing such situations should be
rare, in Grahamv. Florida,the Court stated: "Those who commit truly horrifying
crimes as juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of
incarceration for the duration of their lives." 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010) (emphasis
added).
311. See supra Subpart III.A.
312. Cf Douglas Husak, Lifting the Cloak: Preventive Detention as
Punishment, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1173, 1195 (2011) ("As long as the possession
of the characteristic x, y, and z are under the control of persons the state
preventively detains-as I would insist-punishment would be compatible with
the principle I propose to substitute for the act requirement.").
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an offender's sentence. Rather, they are merely evidence of what a
person will decide to do in the future, in the same way that a finding
of a blameworthy choice in the past may rely on various facts that are
not culpable in themselves, such as marriage to the victim, presence
near the scene of the crime, or possession of a weapon. Risk
assessments try to predict future culpable choices, just as
circumstantial evidence about actus reus and mens rea tries to
postdict culpable choices. Consider again the Virginia instrument
that puts so much weight on age and gender.31 3 While it is extremely
unlikely that those two variables alone provide sufficient predictive
power, if they did and a person was imprisoned rather than diverted
to the community as a result, it would not be because of youth and
gender. Rather, it would be because the RAI indicates he belongs to
a group of people who pose a high probability of choosing to reoffend.
Risk is not pristine desert, but it is not some soulless mechanical
assessment of humans-as-machines either. The debate on this score
has been more hyperbolic than productive.
C.

The Claim of ProceduralInjustice

The fact that risk assessment does not consist simply of
converting people into probability numbers or abstract categories
such as high or low risk does not mean that it is not perceived that
way. Underlying much of the Bill of Rights is the notion that
according dignity to people suspected or convicted of crime is
intrinsically valuable. A suspect may not be subject to search or
seizure without strong justification, those who are accused have the
rights to counsel, public trial, and confrontation, and punishment
cannot be cruel and unusual, but rather must be consistent with
"evolving standards of decency .... "314 Additionally, the procedural
justice literature suggests that for a legal process to be considered
legitimate-especially by those enmeshed in it-it must treat people
with respect, by giving them voice, ensuring a transparent process,
and providing explanations for any decisions made. 3 15 Adhering to

313. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
314. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (interpreting the scope of the
Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause). See also Judith
Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of
Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1935 (2003) ("[W]e
find dignity mentioned in relation to the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment; the Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful
searches and seizures; the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights to be free
from discrimination, and the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to make
one's own decisions on procreation.").
315. The foundational research comes from TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY
THE LAW 115-17 (1990) (describing studies that suggest that perceptions of
fairness hinge on whether disputants feel they have been given a voice in the
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those goals can promote compliance with legal decisions and a more
general sense of an obligation to obey the law, whereas a failure to do
so may lead to less cooperation, not only with the particular decision
but with the government that permits it to happen.31 6
Procedural injustice could be a real danger in an RAI-oriented
regime unless certain precautions are taken. 317 While, compared to
RAIs, clinical predictions may be more susceptible to bias, less
accurate, and equally influenced by stereotypes, they appear to be
more individualized, especially when based on an interview and
framed in psychological terms. That apparent difference may be
exacerbated if, as this Article recommends, RAI results are given
presumptive effect on the issue of risk. Thus, procedures designed to
ensure that litigants have a voice in the process and can challenge the
internal workings of the RAI results are essential.
1.

Voice

If, as Part III argued, postconviction proceedings required
counsel, a truly adversarial process, and transparent algorithms (the
latter issue addressed in more detail below), concerns about
procedural injustice would be substantially diminished. RAIs could
be challenged in several ways. First, offenders would be able to
present their own RAI results. Second, the defense could attack the
accuracy of a conclusion that a particular risk factor is present (e.g.,
the validity of an assumed arrest or conviction, the applicability of a
diagnosis, or the failure to complete a program that in fact was not
available to the offender). Third, defendants could proffer protective
factors that were not considered by the developers of the instrument
(e.g., completion of a treatment or educational program, changes in
employment status); researchers are beginning to identify a number
of such factors.S1S The latter type of evidence should be particularly

&

process and are treated with dignity, as well as whether outcomes are fair over
time).
316. Id. at 56 (suggesting that people comply with the law for a complex set
of reasons that include cost-benefit analysis, the norms of peers, one's own norms,
and the perceived legitimacy of the authorities, but concluding that the last
reason is the most important for policymakers, because titrating deterrence and
changing individual and group norms are both difficult); see also Tom R. Tyler,
ProceduralJustice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST.
283, 297 (2003) (discussing a study that suggests that "procedural justice"
enhances the public's view surrounding the legitimacy of rules and authority and
makes individuals feel obligated to follow the law).
317. See Michael O'Hear, Actuarial Risk Assessment at Sentencing: Potential
Consequences for Mass Incarcerationand Legitimacy, 38 BEHAv. SCI. & L. 193,
195-96 (2020).
318. See Richard B. A. Coupland & Mark E. Olver, Assessing Protective
Factorsin Treated Violent Offenders: Associations with Recidivism Reduction and
Positive Community Outcomes, in 32 PSYCH. ASSESSMENT: A J. OF CONSULTING
CLINICAL PSYCH. 493, 494 (2020).
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useful in humanizing and individualizing the process. It would also
help combat adversarial bias, which research has shown afflicts even
testimony based on relatively objective RAIs.3 19
Two other procedural components are crucial, especially if the
arguments advanced in Part II for a more formal process do not
succeed. 320 First, evaluators, judges, and parole boards must lay out
for defendants how the RAI works and why it reached the conclusions
about risk it did. RAIs can tell a story similar to one that a clinical
expert would tell. This is true even if risk factors are primarily static.
While such factors usually only correlate with risk rather than
explain it, theories do exist as to why they are relevant to predictive
validity (e.g., youth are more impulsive and subject to peer pressure;
people with poor childhoods have fewer adaptive skills; people with
criminal histories tend to repeat them). 321 Explanation along these
lines can meaningfully diminish the perception of robot justice. For
instance, one study of the procedural justice implications of risk
algorithms found that while lay subjects preferred clinical to
actuarial judgment in the abstract, their preferences were reversed
when they were informed that the algorithm was more accurate, and
they were even more likely to prefer algorithms when the factors used
to construct them were made transparent. 322
At the same time, RAIs ideally should contain dynamic factors as
well, because these signal that the individual has some control over
his or her fate. Evaluators and decision-makers should make sure to
describe these factors, particularly protective ones. Likewise, if the
determination is made that intervention is necessary because of the
person's risk, procedural justice would be enhanced if the decisionmaker specifies the types of actions the individual can take to reduce
that risk (e.g., substance abuse treatment, cognitive therapy,
employment). Some RAIs, such as the HCR-20, are more attuned to
this goal because they include dynamic or variable factors that the
This information can
defendant can do something about. 323
communicate to the individual that, whatever the numbers may say,
he or she has the ability to change them.
A second crucial procedural component, whether or not counsel
is involved, is ensuring that RAIs are subject to legislative and
administrative review. For instance, the PATTERN is the result of
the First Step Act of 2018, in which Congress directed that (1) the

319. Stephane M. Shepherd & Danny Sullivan, Covert and Implicit Influences
on the Interpretation of Violence Risk Instruments, 24 PSYCHIATRY PSYCH. & L.
292, 297 (2017) (citing studies).
320. See discussion supra Subpart II.C.
321. See R. Karl Hanson, Giving Meaning to Risk Factors, 15 Pus. SAFETY
CANADA, Nov. 2010, at 1, 1.
322. A.J. Wang, ProceduralJustice and Risk Assessment Algorithms 20 (June
21, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
323. Douglas & Webster, supranote 161, at 8.
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Attorney General develop and release a "risk and needs assessment
system" to determine the "recidivism risk of each prisoner" following
"an objective and statistically validated method," (2) a panel of
researchers approve the instrument, (3) the instrument be annually
validated, and (4) the Bureau of Prison staff "demonstrate
competence in administering the [PATTERN], including interrater
reliability, on a biannual basis." 324 Given that such an instrument is
in effect an informal rule governing "the rights and obligations" of
citizens, such a system could be subject to notice and comment
requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act; 325 in fact, the
Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") did call for public comment and
responded to criticisms about both the validity of the PATTERN
instrument and its relevance and fairness. 326 Ideally, any instrument
produced through such a process would be subject to hard-look review
to ensure that the government can demonstrate it is rationally related
to the state's objectives. 327 Where those instruments are produced by
private companies, Andrea Nishi has made the argument that the
private nondelegation doctrine-the "lesser-known cousin" of the
doctrine applicable to government agencies 328-applies in this setting
and requires that "grants of government power to private entities are
adequately structured to preserve constitutional accountability." 32 9
This upper-level review of RAIs is essential. A federal panel such
as that created by the First Step Act is one possibility; the nowdefunct National Commission of Forensic Science would have been
324. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3632(a)(1), 3632(f)(4), 3635(6).
325. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 172-73 (2007)
(associating notice-and-comment rulemaking with a regulation that "directly
governs the conduct of members of the public, 'affecting individual rights and
obligations"' (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979))); cf
Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1, 25, 32 (2012) (comparing the effects of criminal sentencing
guidelines on citizens to the rationale behind notice and comment procedures).
326. I was one of those who testified on behalf of the American Bar
Association's Criminal Justice Section, consistent with the points made in this
Article. A summary of the responses to the notice and comment period can be
found at The First Step Act Risk and Needs Assessment System. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST., supra note 32, at 25-37. The Department of Justice's Internal Review
Committee did not accept all of the suggestions but is committed to continually
receiving feedback and revalidation efforts. Id. at 84-85.
327. Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICR. L. REV. 355, 379
(2012) ("Hard-look review . . has long been understood as requiring a higher
standard of rationality than the minimum rational basis standard of
constitutional review.").
328. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp. (Amtrak I), 721 F.3d 666, 670
(D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated, 575 U.S. 43 (2015).
329. Andrea Nishi, Privatizing Sentencing: A Delegation Framework for
Recidivism Risk Assessment, 119 CoLUM. L. REV. 1671, 1695 (2019) (quoting
Gillian E. Metzger, Privatizationas Delegation, 103 CoLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1456
(2003)).
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another.3 30 European countries have forensic institutes that are
established to investigate science used in the courts; for instance, in
the United Kingdom, the Ministry of Justice houses the Correctional
Services Accreditation and Advice Panel, which evaluates a tool in
terms of whether it "does what it aims to do." 331 However, for
empirical reasons having to do with assuring the RAI is valid for the
local population, situating validation responsibility at the state level
and ensuring that the state entity takes into account significant
jurisdictional differences (particularly urban-rural divides) makes
the most sense. 332 In fact, a number of state legislatures have
mandated that sentencing judges and corrections officials use a
"validated risk assessment tool," 333 and in other states, the state
sentencing commission, 334 the department of corrections, 335 the state
courts generally, 336 or-as California has done with respect to pretrial
risk assessments-the courts in each jurisdiction, 337 have taken on
the task. As long as the entity employs or can pay for experts who
can develop and validate RAIs and ensure that the validation is peerreviewed by independent experts, it could fulfill a vital procedural
role in a risk assessment regime. 338

330.

See Jules Epstein, The National Commission on Forensic Science:

Impactful or Ineffectual?, 48 SETON HALL L. REv. 743, 748-49 (2018) (describing
the short-lived commission that was disbanded in 2017 by then-Attorney General
Jeff Sessions).
331. Her Majesty's Prison & Prob. Ser., Guidance: Risk Assessment of
Offenders, GOVT DIGIT. SERV. (May 15, 2019), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/riskassessment-of-offenders#what-makes-a-good-risk-assessment-tool.
332. See Alicia Solow-Niederman et al., The InstitutionalLife of Algorithmic
Risk Assessment, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 705, 724-40 (2019) (noting that the
effect of proxies, Simpson's paradox, and thresholding decisions need to be
considered in designing RAIs to be used in diverse jurisdictions).
333. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.335(1) (West) ("In considering the
granting of parole and the terms of parole, the parole board shall use the results
from an inmate's validated risk and needs assessment and any other scientific
means for personality analysis that may hereafter be developed.").
334.
See, e.g., KAN. SENT'G COMM'N, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE IN
KANSAS 3 (2015), https://www.sentencing.ks.gov/docs/default-source/publications
-reports-and-presentations/ksc jri-report.pdf?sfvrsn=2; UTAH SENT'G COMM'N,
2017
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(2020),

https://justice.utah. gov/wp-content/uploads/2020-Adult-Sentencing-and-ReleaseGuidelines.pdf.
335. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.500 (West) (2020).
336. See., e.g., Ariz. Jud. Branch, Evidence-Based Practice,www.azcourts.gov/
apsd/Evidence-Based-Practice/PresentenceReport (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
337. PRETRIAL DET. REFORM WORKGROUP, PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM:
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 52-53 (2017), http://www.courts.ca.gov/

documents/PDRReport-20171023.pdf.
338. Serious consideration should also be given to including non-experts on
the RAI review panel. This is the suggestion of Ngozi Okidegbe in The
DemocratizingPotential of Algorithms? 53 U. CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
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Transparency

None of this is possible, however, if the risk algorithm is not made
available for evaluation. Recall that the company that produces the
COMPAS refuses to reveal its algorithm or the weights assigned to
risk factors, claiming trade secret protection-a claim that the
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld. 339 Thus, the inner workings of the
instrument are hidden. For instance, sophisticated reverseengineering, well beyond the pay grade of defense attorneys or judges,
is needed to figure out the fact that while the COMPAS contains more
than one hundred factors, over half of the risk score it produces is
attributable to a single factor: the offender's age. 34 0
Even purportedly publicly developed instruments can be less
than transparent. Congress required that the PATTERN be made
public, 34 1 but did not require that the validation procedure that led to
development of the instrument nor the data underlying it be
disclosed. When asked for more information, the authors of the
instrument stated that state-law-driven privacy concerns prevented
release even of anonymized versions of the data to outside
researchers. 342 A number of states have responded to similar
requests in the same fashion. 343
The integration of sophisticated machine learning into RAI
construction could make matters worse, since under some versions of
that technique the weights assigned to risk factors and even the

("[T]he exclusion of these communities within algorithmic governance operates
to reinforce and legitimize the barriers that already impede these communities'
ability to challenge or gain control over the very criminal justice institutions
responsible
for
their
oversurveillance,
overcriminalization,
and
overincarceration.").
339. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 761 (Wis. 2016) (holding that because
Loomis had access to the questions the COMPAS asked and the risk assessment
itself, he did not need access to "how the risk scores are determined or how the
factors are weighed").
340. Megan T. Stevenson & Christopher Slobogin, Algorithmic Risk
Assessments and the Double-Edged Sword of Youth, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 681,
688-98 (2018).
341. 18 U.S.C. § 3631(b)(4) (requiring the Attorney General, inter alia, to "on
an annual basis, review, validate, and release publicly on the Department of
Justice website the risk and needs assessment system").
342. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: RISK AND NEEDS
ASSESSMENT SYSTEM-UPDATE 14-15 (Jan. 2020), https://www.bop.gov/inmates/

fsa/docs/the-first-step-act-of-2018-risk-and-needs -assessment-systemupdated.pdf.
343. Nicholas Diakopoulos, We Need to Know the Algorithms the Government
Uses to Make Important Decisions About Us (May 23, 2016, 8:48 PM),
https ://theconversation.com/we-need-to-know-the-algorithms -the-governmentuses-to-make-important-decisions-about-us-57869 (noting that only one state
responded fully to Freedom of Information Act requests for algorithm documents
and source codes).
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identity of those factors are inaccessible to humans. 34 4 Furthermore,
even if the black box can be opened, serious interpretation problems
can arise. More specifically, as Andrew Selbst and Solon Barocas
note, some versions of machine learning can be either "inscrutable"meaning that even when a model is available for direct inspection it
may "defy understanding"-or "non-intuitive"-meaning that even
where a model is understandable it may "rest on apparent statistical
relationships that defy intuition." 345
Proprietary interests and algorithmic opacity could stymie
meaningful challenges to RAI results and empirical investigations of
its validity. Egalitarian and retributive justice cannot be evaluated
without knowing whether risk scores are based on race, gender, age,
wealth classifications, or proxies for them and the extent to which
they purport to help the state achieve its aim in evaluating risk. The
accuracy of the probabilities and other results reached by an RAI
cannot be confirmed unless the underlying data and the empirical
analysis using it can be evaluated by others. And decision-makers
cannot know whether to permit or engage in "adjustments" to a risk
assessment based on factors not considered in the instrument unless
they know what those factors are.
Once again, Supreme Court jurisprudence provides grounds for
contesting this situation. In Gardner v. Florida,34 6 the defendant
argued that, before his death sentence was imposed, he had a due
process right to discover and rebut the contents of his presentence
report. 347 The government objected to this claim on a number of
grounds: such discovery, it claimed, would make sources reluctant to
provide information, would delay the process, might disrupt
rehabilitation given the psychological information contained in such
reports, and was not necessary given the expertise of judges. 34 8 But
the Supreme Court rejected all of these arguments (many of which
might be made in defending informal use of RAIs as well), stating:
"Our belief that debate between adversaries is often essential to the
truth-seeking function of trials requires us also to recognize the
importance of giving counsel an opportunity to comment on facts
which may influence the sentencing decision . . . ."349

344. See generally Doaa Abu Elyounes, Bail or Jail? Judicial Versus
Algorithmic Decision-Makingin the PretrialSystem, 21 CoLuM. SCi. & TECH. L.
REv. 376 (2020) (describing various types of machine learning algorithms and
possible difficulties with discerning how they work, but also noting that most
RAIs today rely on "traditional regression analysis" and are transparent with
respect to the factors considered and the weight they are given).
345. Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable
Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1091 (2018).
346. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
347. Id. at 353-55.
348. Id. at 358-60.
349. Id. at 360.
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Gardnerinvolved capital punishment, where the Supreme Court
has been particularly meticulous about accuracy. But in Roviaro v.
United States,3 50 involving a simple drug case, the Court similarly
held that the identity of confidential informants must be revealed to
the defendant when the informant possesses facts that are relevant
to the defense.3Si Although it involved a confidential informant
rather than a confidential algorithm, Roviaro establishes that even
strong claims of a need for secrecy (here protecting an informant)
should not prevail when the information is crucial to the case. 352
While Roviaro has been given short shrift in more recent lower court
decisions,35 3 its central rationale has not been abandoned.3 5 4 Some
lower courts have followed the logic of these opinions in requiring that
defendants be given the facts and opinions underlying their proposed
sentences and an opportunity to rebut them.35 5
Scholars have also made subconstitutional arguments in favor of
open algorithms.
Danielle Citron has contended that private
companies that seek public money for products that affect public
policy should not be able to hide behind trade secret laws, 356 and
Rebecca Wexler has noted that companies' concerns about giving
competitors an advantage or discouraging innovation are overblown,
especially if protective orders or in camera review requirements are
imposed.35 7 Special attention has been paid to the opacity problems
created by machine learning.
Most prominently, scholars have

350. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
351. Id. at 64-65.
352. See Zathrina Zasell Gutierrez Perez, Note, Piercingthe Veil of Informant
Confidentiality: The Role of In Camera Hearings in the Roviaro Determination,
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 179, 192-94 (2009) (discussing the Roviaro holding).
353. See id. at 201-13 (describing United States Circuit Courts of Appeal
approaches to Roviaro).

354. Id.

&

355. United States v. Milian-Isaac, 749 F.3d 57, 70 (1st Cir. 2014); Smith v.
Woods, 505 F. App'x 560, 568 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Hayes, 171 F.3d
389, 394 (6th Cir. 1999).
356. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249, 1290-91 (2008) ("[T]he public . .
[and] government actors are unable to
influence policy when it is shrouded in closed code.").
357. See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual
Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REv. 1343, 1403-13 (2018)
(arguing that, given protective orders and other procedural devices, trade secret
privilege is unnecessary in criminal cases); see also Danielle Keats Citron
Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89
WASH. L. REV. 1, 26 (2014) ("There is little evidence that the inability to keep such
systems secret would diminish innovation."). It is noteworthy that intellectual
property claims have also been rejected in civil cases when the potential for error
resulting from opacity is "obvious" and "substantial." See K.W. v. Armstrong, 180
F. Supp. 3d. 703, 716-17 (D. Idaho 2016).
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argued for a "right to explanation,"3 5 8 a right that the European
Union has explicitly recognized in its General Data Privacy
Regulation.3 5 9
That right is particularly important in the criminal context, for
the reasons advanced in Gardner. Even if it turns out that advanced
RAIs are demonstrably more accurate than simpler versions (which
is unlikely),36 0 they should be banned from criminal proceedings, at
least when they are "inscrutable;" litigants, policymakers, and
decision-makers must be provided with understandable information
about how they work.36 1 Specifically, developers ought to provide:
,

[A] complete description of the design and testing process . .
[a] list of factors that the tool uses and how it weighs them, [t]he
thresholds and data used to determine labels for risk
scores,... [t]he outcome data used to develop and validate the
tool at an aggregate and privacy-protecting level, disclosing

breakdown of rearrests by charge, severity of charge, . . . age,
race, and gender [and] clear definitions of what an instrument
forecasts and for what time period.3 6 2
Without the ability to investigate the basis of decisions about risk,
injustice-not only procedural injustice but also egalitarian and
retributive injustice-will have fertile ground in which to flourish.

358. See Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 209-17 (2019) (reviewing the literature).
359. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing
Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 40-43 (EU).
360. ALEXANDRA CHOULDECHOVA & KRISTIAN LUM, THE PRESENT AND FUTURE
OF Al IN PRE-TRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 3 (2020) ("Al technologies are

not likely to achieve considerably greater predictive accuracy than currently
available risk assessment instruments."); Desmarais & Zottola, supra note 36, at
813-16 (surveying research and concluding that "these findings suggest that
there is no real advantage to using complex statistical models that are
challenging for the layperson to understand").
361. Selbst & Barocas, supra note 345, at 1110 ("[With respect to providing
transparency, r]esearchers have developed at least three different ways to
respond to the demand for explanations: (1) purposefully orchestrating the
machine learning process such that the resulting model is interpretable; (2)
applying special techniques after model creation to approximate the model in a
more readily intelligible form or identify features that are most salient for specific
decisions; and (3) providing tools that allow people to interact with the model and
get a sense of its operation.").
362. DAVID G. ROBINSON & LOGAN KOEPKE, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PRETRIAL RISK
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 11 (2019); see also Kleinberg et al., supranote 268, at
2 ("[A]ll the components of an algorithm (including the training data) must be
stored and made available for examination and experimentation.").
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V. CONCLUSION-THE NEED FOR EXPERIMENTATION

Risk and needs assessment instruments are crucial tools for
pinpointing the hundreds of thousands of offenders who can, with
relative safety, be diverted to community programs or be released
with no restrictions. Without the quantitative clarity and authority
of these instruments, governments will have neither the wherewithal
nor the will to make serious inroads on our incarcerated populations.
Given retributive urges, decriminalization will at most affect the
lowest-level misdemeanors.
For the same reason, significant
reductions in sentences for more serious crimes are unlikely to be
countenanced by the American public unless those reductions take
place on an individualized basis and can be shown to be of lower-risk
offenders. And without concrete proof that particular offenders are
low risk, our elected and politically appointed decision-makers are,
understandably, unlikely to opt against confinement.
In short, if the goal is to make significant inroads on the
incarcerated population in the United States, risk assessment
technology may be the only realistic method of doing so. RAIs would
have an even greater impact if they are given presumptive effect. And
they should have greater impact still if they are used within a system
of preventive justice that relies on risk to calibrate the nature and
length of sentences within a retributive framework.
Many jurisdictions are already using RAIs. But very few vet
those instruments through a peer review process, give their results
presumptive effect, or train judges, lawyers, and correctional officials
in their use. Until a few pioneering jurisdictions give RAIs a fair shot,
we cannot know whether the hypotheses that this Article advances
about their benefits will be borne out. If the integration of wellconstructed and presumptively applied RAIs into postconviction
settings does not significantly reduce incarcerated populations,
recidivism rates, and prison costs, it is probably not worth pursuing
on a nationwide basis. But the bet here is that, without such
experimentation, the American carceral system will be stuck where it
is now for some time to come.

